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A New Approach to Executory Contracts
John A. E Pottow*

I.

Introduction and Summary

F

ew topics have bedeviled the bankruptcy community as much as
the proper treatment of executory contracts under section 365 of
the Bankruptcy Code. 1 The case law is "hopelessly convoluted" and a
''bramble-filled thicket.',,_ While many have struggled in the bootless
task of providing coherence to the unwieldy corpus of case law and
commentary, all would agree Jay Westbrook has been at the modem
vanguard of this Sisyphean task.3 (I assign Westbrook to the "modem"
forefront, thereby relegating Vern Countryman, whose legacy in this
domain rightly persists, to the annals of history, choosing as my perhaps
arbitrary dividing line the adoption of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code.)4
• John Philip Dawson Collegiate Professor of Law at the University of Michigan
Law School. The author thanks Conor McNamara, Michigan JD class of 2018, for
research assistance. He also thanks Asher Steinberg, as well as all participants in the
symposium (too many of whom to list here generously gave me comments). Copyright © 96 Tex. L. Rev. 1437-82 (2018). Reproduced here with permission.
I. II u.s.c. j 365 (2012).

,. Cohen v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc. (In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp.,
Inc.), 138 B.R. 687, 690 (Banlcr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citations omitted).
See, e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 Minn. L. Rev. 227, 239 (1989).
4· II U.S.C. J IOI (2012). See generally Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in
Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 Minn. L. Rev. 439, 442-44 (1973) [hereinafter Countryman I]
(propounding a seminal test).
3·
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534 JOHN A E. POTTOW

Why have executory contracts proved so nettlesome? Under the
Code, a large part of the damage is self-inflicted, resulting from unfortunate drafting that begat an ever-accumulating snowball of confused
jurisprudence.5 But there is also a salience bias (vividness bias, really) at
work of disproportionate focus on the striking plight of the contractual counterparty who is aggrieved when a debtor deploys executorycontract rights under section 365-rights that accord the debtor certain
powers in dealing with executory contracts otherwise unavailable at
state law. (This bias underestimates the baseline unhappiness that
bankruptcy inflicts upon all creditors equally and fairly.) Westbrook
has relatedly noted that courts in their struggle to do equity under the
Code sometimes resist these executory-contract powers.6 ln doing so,
they gravitate to the textual restriction of section 365 to "executory"
contracts.7 Skeptical courts frequently conclude that a contract is not
"executory"-and therefore cannot fall under section 365-to deny
relief that strikes these courts as unseemly. Indeed, a judicial cottage
industry in bankruptcy has developed on the definition of"executoriness" and concomitant scope of access to section 365. 8
Countryman gets first credit for tackling the definitional challenge of what it means for a contract to be "executory" under the
prior Bankruptcy Act. His eponymous test for executoriness is
well cited in many opinions and is otherwise known as the "material breach" test. 9 Westbrook, albeit with characteristic, gentility,
upended that doctrinal framework by advocating an abolition of the
concept of executoriness from the Code altogether and replacing it
by (or subsuming it within) a "functional" analysis focused on debtor
See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
Jay Lawrence Westbrook & Kelsi Stayart White, The Demystification of Contracts
in Bankruptcy, 91 Am. Bankr. L.J. 481, 510-u (2017) (''The problem with wild cards is
that chance-sometimes found under the mask of equity-can favor either player.").
7· II U.S.C. i 365(a) (2012) (referencing "executory" contracts).
8· See, e.g., Am. Bankr. Inst., Commission to Study the Reform of chapter II,
u2 (2014) [hereinafter ABI Report] ("[C)ourt[s] on a case-by-case basis determine□
whether a particular contract is executory."); Westbrook & White, supra note 6, at
494-95 (noting that "courts continued to expand the application" of multiple executoriness tests "to more and more kinds of contracts"),
9. Countryman I, supra note 4, at 460.
5·

6•
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economic benefit. 10 His executoriness discussion, started three decades ago, and especially his back-and-forth on the topic with Michael
Andrew, is canonical bankruptcy scholarship.n
The challenges ofdefining executoriness persist through today. The
recent American Bankruptcy lnstitute's Commission on the Reform
of chapter u tasked a specific Expert Group to examine the Code's
treatment of executory contracts.12 The Group's first recommendation was to abolish the requirement of executoriness as a restriction
on section 365. 13 (Yes, Westbrook was front and center on the group.)
The Commission, however, stunned the insolvency community by not
only rejecting the Group's recommendation, albeit in an apparently
divided decision, but doubling down on executoriness: it advocated
its retention in the Code and the codification of the Countryman material breach test for definition.14 ln doing so, the Commission notedwithout an apparent whiff of irony-that this decision would allow
reliance on "well developed" case law.15 To describe the executorycontracts precedents in bankruptcy as "well developed" (or even "vaguely
helpful") skirts credulity.16 Were the Commission's recommendations
Westbrook, supra note 3, at 230.
"· See generally Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding "Rejection," 59 U. Colo. L. Rev. 845,849 (1988) [hereinafter Andrew, Rejection] (characterizing "the election to 'assume or reject' [as] the election to assume
or not assume"); Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts Revisited: A Reply to
Professor Westbrook, 62 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1991) [hereinafter Andrew, Reply to
Westbrook] (noting "contrary views on specific elements of Westbrook's analysis").
12 · See generally ABI Report, supra note 8 (outlining "Recommended Principlesn
for the treatment of executory contracts in bankruptcy).
' 3· Advisory Comm. on Executory Contracts and Leases, ABI Commission to
Study the Reform of chapter n: Executive Summary Regarding Section 365 Issues
1 (2013) [hereinafter ABI Advisory Committee] ("The Advisory Committee recommends eliminating the term 'executory' in favor of adopting the Functional Test
which allows the trustee or debtor in possession ..• to keep beneficial contracts
and reject burdensome ones based solely upon benefit/harm to the estate.n), http://
commission.abi.org/sites/default/files/ABI-365-Comm-Overview-Summary_
(WEST_34307609_3).DOCX [https://perma.cc/2PH7-GCHJ].
••· ABl Report, supra note 8, at n2.
•s- Jd. at 112, 115 (describing case law as a "valuable resource").
16· See Westbrook & White, supra note 6, at 497 ("[T]here was no thorough explanation of the majority recommendation or how it addresses the courts' frustration
with executoriness analysis and their divergent conclusions. j.
10•
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in any danger of attracting congressional attention, this linguistic legerdemain might be worrisome, but thankfully the dysfunction of our
modem Congress has ridden to the rescue. Thus, the debate over the
role {and very definition) of "executoriness" in bankruptcy law has not
only been rekindled, but appears to be here to stay.
Acknowledging that the thrust of commentary heeds Westbrook's
call to abolish executoriness as a gatekeeper to the section 365 powers,17 I want to offer a novel approach and argue against that grain.
Specifically, in this Article I will suggest not only that the fight should
be called off, but that defeat should be conceded. Executoriness, for
better or worse {mostly worse), is here to stay in the Code. My resignation may seem like Westbrook heresy, but there is a method to my
madness. Here is my key contention: the impulse behind the resistance to the abolition of executoriness, reflected most recently by the
American Bankruptcy Institute {ABI) Commission's intransigence, is
at root a reluctance {perhaps conscious, perhaps not) by elite lawyers
to relinquish what they feel is a legal arbitrage opportunity to combat debtor power. 18 Namely, counterparties believe that the doctrinal
fluidity of the concept of executoriness allows them wide latitude to
argue a contract is executory when such a classification will accord
them legal advantage over the debtor but in the next case argue that a
similar contract is not executory when that contrary label will accord
the leg up.19 As such, executoriness's confusion and uncertainty is a
feature rather than a bug.
Principled commentators like Westbrook decry this sneakiness, bemoaning the deadweight litigation loss. A clear, sensible
11· As far back as 1997, The National Bankruptcy Review Commission recommended deleting "executory" from section 365 to end the executoriness debates.
Nat'l Banlcr. Review Comm'n, Banlcruptcy: The Next Twenty Years 454 (1997).
18· Economically, the ambiguity creates more of an option value than an arbitrage
because there are not, of course, two separate markets, but l use arbitrage because
l think it better captures the two-facedness of the evil presented.
' 9• Beyond the scope of this chapter is a formal model of the role of risk aversion
addressing why lawyers do not equally foresee enjoying the benefits of being the
debtor's counsel with the offsetting section 365 power they so fear. Loss aversion is
likely interacting with the vividness bias.
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rule defining executoriness should be established with a defensible
normative foundation. Countryman offered one; Westbrook had
another. 20 My approach sidesteps this skirmish. Rather than fight on
what the definition of executoriness should be in an effort to wipe
out the grey zone, my tack is to blunt the arbitrage impulse ab initio.
The way to do so is by taking seriously how the Code should treat
a non-executory contract, the presumable residual category of a contract flunking the executoriness test (whatever test is selected). The
treatment of non-executory contracts is woefully undertheorized
in bankruptcy literature, and so I try to fill this unwelcome void 21
Indeed, cases where executoriness is litigated simply end after a declaration of non-executoriness without any rigorous working-through
of the consequences.22 This is regrettable. Treating the structure and
policies of the Bankruptcy Code holistically, I will try to show what
should happen to a non-executory contract in bankruptcy, entirely
outside the domain of section 365. My conclusion is that while nonexecutory contracts may be treated as formally distinct from executory contracts, their functional outcomes will mimic those of executory
contracts by synthetic replication through other Code provisions. If my
analysis holds and non-executory contracts, while different, garner
largely similar treatment to executory contracts, then the pernicious
opportunity for arbitrage from the executoriness game will collapse.
This chapter will proceed as follows. First, it will offer an abbreviated explanation of the treatment of executory contracts under the
Code, chronicling the development of the concept of executoriness
w. Compare infra note 63 and accompanying text (Countryman), with infra note
73 and accompanying text (Westbrook).
2 1. "[O]ne rule that could be considered 'well-settled' is that once a contract has
been determined to be 'non-executory; there are no rules." Westbrook & White,
supra note 6, at 498. Even Countryman, whose treatment of executory contracts is
encyclopedic, at most indirectly intimated at the proper treatment of non-executory
contracts. See id. at 519 (characterizing charitably Countryman's treatment of the
issue as "implicit").
22 • See, e.g., In re Drake, 136 B.R. 325, 328 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992) ("fnhe [a]greement cannot be deemed executory.j; see also Westbrook & White, supra note 6, at
499 (collecting cases).
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and the subsequent challenges of its effects. Second, it will explain a
new approach that embraces and makes its peace with executoriness
by focusing on the proper treatment of non-executory contracts.
Third, it will address some of the anticipated counterarguments to
the new approach. Finally, it will offer a quick road test to demonstrate how the new approach would have more easily resolved a
major litigated precedent in this field.

II. The Problem of Executoriness and the
Traditional Approach(es)
A. The Genesis of Executoriness and Section 365
1. The Historical Problem ofProvability

Insolvency systems have been wrestling with executory-contract rights
for quite some time. For example, the 1898 Bankruptcy Act sometimes
respected so-called ipso facto clauses that terminate contracts automatically (ipso facto) upon the insolvency of a party, 23 an outcome now
banned under section 365.24 But the origin of the problems of modem
executory contracts has to do with statutory drafting that addressed a
different issue-the now-abolished concept of provability. Under the
Act, only some financial grievances against an insolvent debtor were

' 3· See, e.g., Irving Tr. Co. v.A.W. Perry, Inc., 293 U.S. 307, 3n (1934) (holding enforceable a provision that provided the "filing of the petition in bankruptcy was ... a
breach of the lease"). Even the old cases bristled at this doctrine and so cabined its
reach at every tum. See, e.g., Gazlay v. Williams, 2ro U.S. 41, 48-49 (1908) (holding
the ipso facto provision ineffective); see also Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts
in Bankruptcy: Part II, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 479,522 (1974) [hereinafter Countryman ll]
(noting the old Act's "forfeiture provisions ... are by their terms confined to leases").
I am leaving aside in this historical discussion the bizarre, now largely buried doctrine of "anticipatory breach" by bankruptcy. See Cent. Tr. Co. v. Chi. Auditorium
Ass'n, 240 U.S. 581, 592 (1916) ("We conclude that proceedings, whether voluntary
or involuntary, resulting in an adjudication of bankruptcy, are the equivalent of an
anticipatory breach of an executory agreement.").
'4• II U.S.C. j 365(e) (2012).
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"provable,"25 which functioned as a sort of bankruptcy version of ripeness. Consider, for example, a debtor who ran over someone's foot.
The victim might claim money is owing; the debtor-driver might
deny liability. lf no lawsuit had yet been commenced, let alone concluded with a monetary judgment of a debt owing, then the claim was
not provable in the debtor's bankruptcy proceeding. 26 This could be a
mixed blessing. It was initially bad for the creditors, because they could
not participate in the division of the debtor's assets, but it was sometimes good as well, because if the debtor survived after bankruptcy
(e.g., the debtor was an individual or a reorganized corporation), then
the unprovable claim survived as well, continuing to haunt the debtor
post-discharge.27 But if the debtor were a corporation in liquidation,
the provability bar was all bad news for the creditor.
What about contracts? To understand the impact of provability,
we first need to understand what trustees did with contracts, and to
understand that, we need to understand what they did with leases.
As remains the case today, trustees were entitled to all the debtor's
property (some would say, "vest in title," some would say, "control
as a mere custodian"), 28 but they were also free to abandon uneconomical assets. 29 The abandonment doctrine applied to leases of
real property as well. 30 If the debtor had an ongoing ("unexpired")

25 · See, e.g., Zavelo v. Reeves, 227 U.S. 625, 632 (1913) ("[O}nly provable debts are
discharged.").
26· See, e.g., Brown & Adams v. United Button Co., 149 F. 48, 53 (3d Cir. 1906) (holding that a claim for unliquidated damages that results from the injured property of
another is not provable in bankruptcy).
27 · See Countryman 1, supra note 4, at 443 ("[U]nder section 17a of the Bankruptcy
Act only provable debts are discharged.").
28 · n U.S.C. § 541(a) (2012). While assignees under the Acts vested in the debtor's
property outright, equity receivers (who preceded modem reorganizations) merely
controlled debtor property as custodians. Quincy, Mo. & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Humphreys,
145 U.S. 82, 97 (1892) ("[The equity receivers] were ministerial officers, ... mere
custodians.").
29 · See Am. File Co. v. Garrett, no U.S. 288, 295 (1884) (recognizing the principle
based on historical English practice).
30 · See, e.g., Quincy, Mo., 145 U.S. at 102 (applying the abandonment doctrine to
a long-term lease).
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lease that was financially burdensome, the trustee could abandon it.
Now, that raised a provability problem, especially when traditional
real-property remedies are considered.31 Under many states' property law, the rent covenant stemmed from the realty itself, and so
dispossession terminated the prospective obligation to pay rent.32
(The separate contractual promise to pay the rent prospectively,
which the trustee might have breached by rejecting the lease, was
a separate problem.)33 In other words, while the bankruptcy system
could get its head around a claim for unpaid back rent quite well
(a debt owing to the creditor/landlord), it struggled with whether
a claim for unpaid future rent triggered by the trustee's abandonment of an uneconomical long-term lease was provable, especially
when the landlord had possession of the land returned by the debtor's vacating the premises.
Related uncertainty befell contracts. If the debtor were current
on any invoices, would abandonment ("rejection") of the contract
trigger a provable claim for breach of future expectation loss?34 Case
law initially struggled, much wanting to find that it should.35 Congress tried to clarify the matter, beginning in 1933, to allow for more
widespread provability. Starting with railroad receivership cases in
section 77 of the Act (amended two years later), it allowed for a rejection counterparty to be "deemed ... a creditor ... to the extent of the

JI. The provability problem extended to leases of personalty as well. See Countryman I, supra note 4, at 449-50 n.50 (collecting cases).
µ. For example, William Filene's Sons Co. v. Weed, 245 U.S. 597, 601 (1918) ("Rent
issues from the land.").
n- See Miller v. Irving Tr. Co., 296 U.S. 256, 258 (1935) ("Under the clause in question, it was, at the time the petition in bankruptcy was filed, uncertain, a mere matter of speculation, whether any liability ever would arise under it.").
34• The older Acts were more forgiving of contract provability than "pure tort."
For example., section 63a(8) allowed for provability of "contingent contractual liabilities," but not tort claims, Schall v. Comers, 251 U.S. 239, 248-49, 253 (1920), absent
reduction to judgment (or implied assumpsit), Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S.
328, 331 (1934).
JS. See, e.g., Irving Tr. Co. v. AW. Perry, Inc., 293 U.S. 307, 310-n (1934) (holding an
ipso facto clause effective to terminate a lease and trigger a provable claim).
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actual damage or injury."36 Section 77 begat 77B (extending the application beyond railroad reorganizations to corporations), which in
turn begat chapter X in 1938's Chandler Act's more general corporate
reorganization "chapter" provisions.37
Similarly, in the liquidation context, 1934 amendments to the
Act's section 63a(7) allowed for "claims for damages respecting executory contracts including future rents," which was rewritten in the
Chandler Act for "claims for anticipatory breach of contracts, executory in whole or in part, including unexpired leases of real or personal
property. "38 These amendments also resolved what was implicit from
the abandonment doctrine: that the trustee could never be forced
to take unwanted property; it was the trustee's election whether to
assume or reject an unexpired lease,39 and so Congress provided that
affinnative acknowledgment was required to assume a lease, with the
default in liquidation being deemed rejection after a period of time.
Specifically, "[w]ithin sixty days after the adjudication, the trustee
shall assume or reject any executory contract, including unexpired
leases of real property.... Any such contract or lease not assumed
or rejected within such time ... shall be deemed to be rejected." 40
36· Bankruptcy Act, ch. 774, section 77, 49 Stat. 911, 914 (1935); see also Bankruptcy
Act, ch. 204, section 77, 47 Stat. 1467, 1474 (1933) (allowing creditors of a railroad to
file a petition).
37· Bankruptcy Act, ch. 424, section 77B, 48 Stat. 9n, 915 (1934) (including "claims
under executory contracts, whether or not such claims would otherwise constitute
provable claims under this Act").
38· Bankruptcy Act, ch. 424, section 6µ(7), 48 Stat. 9u, 924 (1934) (emphasis added);
Bankruptcy Act, ch. 575, section 63a(9), 52 Stat. 840, 873 (1938) (emphasis added).
39• See United States Tr. Co. v. Wabash W. Ry. Co., 150 U.S. 287, 299-300 (1893) ("The
general rule ... is undisputed that an assignee or receiver is not bound to adopt the
contracts, accept the leases, or otherwise step into the shoes of his assignor, if in
his opinion it would be unprofitable or undesirable to do so; and he is entitled to a
reasonable time to elect whether to adopt or repudiate such contracts.").
40 · Bankruptcy Act, ch. 575, section 70b, 52 Stat. 840, 880-81 (1938). Countryman
chronicles how the judicially created doctrine of abandonment carried forth the
English practice that "[i]t has long been a recognized principle of the bankrupt [sic]
laws that the assignees were not bound to accept property of an onerous or unprofitable character." Countryman I, supra note 4, at 440 (quoting Am. File Co. v. Garrett,
IIO U.S. 288, 295 (1884)).
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This explicit treatment oflease claims under section 63a(7) and contract claims under section 63a(9), albeit with slightly different language, solved the provability conundrum of postpetition repudiation
("rejection") damages for these unfinished transactions; they were
henceforth all provable claims. This statutory introduction of the
term "executory" made sense, of course, because only if a contract
is executory (i.e., not completely "executed") can there be a claim for
anticipatory repudiation upon the trustee's disclamation. 41 lf the contract is fully performed, by contrast, there are no future obligations
over which to fight about provability, only unpaid matured debts to
be filed as claims.42 Similarly, a lease needs to be unexpired for there to
be a potential breach claim for unpaid future rents. An expired lease
may have some back rent owing but again raises no provability issues;
fully concluded transactions are unremarkable for provability. Thus,
"executory" entered the U.S. bankruptcy statutory lexicon through
these Depression-era provisions that were designed to clarify the
provability status of claims for unfulfilled future obligations triggered by a bankruptcy trustee's abandonment of financial detritus.

2. .Provahility sSolution and the Introduction ofExecutoriness
(and Section 365)

As part of Congress's bankruptcy overhaul resulting in the 1978 Code,
the concept of provability was finally abolished with a wide definition
of "claim" that covered all conceivable monetary obligations, such as
contingent, unmatured, and unliquidated claims, like the tort cause
of action discussed previously.41 Everything was now a "claim" and
hence both provable and dischargeable in a bankruptcy proceeding
(no more haunting the discharged debtor with the financial sins of
<IL Se~ Andrew, Reply to Westbrook, supra note II, at 34 n.155 (noting that under
e ~wv~ent U.K. Insolvency Act, a trustee may "disclaim" "any unprofitable contract, which has the effect of its exclusion from the estate) (citations omitted) .
.p. II U.S.C. j 502 (2012).

th

ru

4

3- Jdc:~ction I0~(5); H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 180 (1977) ("H.R. 8200[, the Bankp~ . e,J abolishes the concept of provability in bankruptcy cases."). (Source
text 1S entirely capitalized.).
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the past). With everything becoming provable, the very need for that
term was eliminated. 44 Congress's intent in so doing was to corral every
possible financial beef with a debtor into one forum and compel resolution with comprehensive fi.nality. 45 This neater solution was widely
praised and, had Congress just thought of it back in 1938, would have
obviated the requirement for section 63a and the language of "executory" contracts. 46 Congress also consolidated the prior Chandler Act
provisions into section 365, which now covers the estate's treatment
of executory contracts and unexpired leases.47 Section 365(a) provides:
"[f]he trustee, subject to the court's approval, may assume or reject
any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor."48
Note that section 365(a) codified the court's oversight role in the
assumption or rejection of contracts, too, which in tum spawned
jurisprudence over the standard by which the court ought to assess
the debtor's decision (with a majority approach settling on a business
44 · Well, nearly everything. A painful strand of cases has emerged finding that
executory contracts (usually leases) neither assumed nor rejected in a chapter II
simply "ride through," saddling the debtor with an ongoing lease and the counterparty with an unprovable claim. For example, In re Bos. Post Rd. Ltd. P'ship, 21 F.3d
477, 484 (2d Cir. 1994) ("A debtor in chapter II must either assume or reject its leases
with third parties .... lf the debtor does neither, the leases continue in effect and the
lessees have no provable claim against the bankruptcy estate.").
45 · See H.R Rep. No. 95-595, at 309 ("By this broadest possible definition [of
claim] ... the Bill contemplates that all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter
how remote or contingent, will be able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy case."}
(Source text is entirely capitalized.}; S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 21-22 (1978) (using the
same language); H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. 2, at 154-55 nn.1-5 (1973} (containing the
proposed text).
46 · See, e.g., Westbrook & White, supra note 6, at 494 (describing the "Code['s]
eliminat[ion of] the concept of'provability'" as an "important change"); see also In re
M.A.S. Realty Corp., 318 B.R. 234, 237 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2004) (describing the revision
that eliminated provability as "a distinction of critical importance"); Cohen v. Drexel
Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc. (In re Drex£1 Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc.), 138 B.R. 687,
706-07 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (describing the Code's abolishment of provability as a
"structural innovation□").
47· See Westbrook & White, supra note 6, at 492 ("These [statutory] origins are
important because they reveal that Congress intended the statutory predecessor
to section 365 to ensure that counterparties holding rejected contracts, including
leases, would be paid and discharged.").
48 · n U.S.C. § 365(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
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judgment rule level of deference). 49 But even more important than
section 365(a) was the power conferred on trustees and debtors
under section 365(b). Unhelpfully phrased as a restriction on assumption, section 365(b)'s true import is to confer a power upon the debtor
to cure contractual defaults.
lf there has been a default in an executory contract or unexpired
lease of the debtor, the trustee may not assume such contract or
lease unless, at the time of assumption of such contract or lease, the
trustee-(A) cures, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee
will promptly cure, such default. 50
This flex of preemptive federal law trumps general state contract law, because a material breach of contract ordinarily allows the
aggrieved counterparty the self-help remedy of termination.5' Section 365(b) overrides this and says notwithstanding the (material)
breach of an executory contract, if the breach is cured pursuant to
section 365(b), the debtor in federal bankruptcy may assume the contract and carry on under its benefits. The counterparty's self-help
remedy of termination is scuttled.52 This cure-and-assume power
irritates contractual counterparties tremendously, of course, because
the contracts those parties most want to terminate are bad deals that
they made, which are by zero-sum game reasoning precisely the sorts
of good deals that the debtor/trustee is anxious to assume. But for
section 365(b), the debtor would be unable to do this in the face of a
material breach at common law. Counterparties equally hate a debtor's rejection of an executory contract containing a good deal for the
counterparty by the same logic.
49· Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043, 1046 (4th Cir. 1985) ("[The] question [of acceptance or

rejection] must start with ... deference mandated by the sound business judgment
rule .... ").
5° n U.S.C. § 365(b)(1) (2012).
5' 1 Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 237 (Am. Law Inst. 1981).
5'· See, e.g., ln re Circle K Corp., 190 B.R. 370, 376 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995) (noting
how section 365(b) overruled such pre-Code cases as In re Schokbeton Indus., Inc.,
466 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1972), which held that breach precludes assumption and bankruptcy accords no power to cure).
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Section 365's power is even worse for the counterparty, because it
cannot even be "contracted around." For example, the parties' decision to say that a filing for bankruptcy ipso facto terminates the contract is explicitly invalidated.53 And even seemingly impossible-to-cure
breaches are, in some contexts, excused under section 365.54 In sum,
section 365 provides a powerful arrow in the debtor's quiver, according the debtor the option to "reshape" the bankruptcy estate with
an option to assume valuable contractual rights,55 either for performance by the debtor itself or for assignment to a third party for a
price, notwithstanding the existence of a breach. 56

B. Executoriness as a Restraint on Section 365: The
Creation of New Problems

Counterparty hostility to section 365 drives the annals of case law
of litigants seeking to avoid its reach. And the key to their stratagem is textual seizure upon the statutory qualifier that only "executory" contracts are subject to section 365 and all her debtor powers.
Aggrieved counterparties often insist that the debtor's contract is not
an executory contract and hence cannot "enter" section 365. Important for explaining the chaotic case law in this area, the litigious
counterparties are what might be called "equal opportunity executoriness critics." When the debtor had a good contract (and hence a
bad one for the counterparty) it sought to assume, the counterparty
would claim the contract was not executory and, therefore, could
not avail itself of the cure and assumption powers of section 365.57

U.S.C. § 365(e)(1) (2012).
Id. section 365(b)(1)(A) (rescuing certain lease defaults).
55 · Elizabeth Warren, Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Katherine Porter & John AE. Pottow, The Law of Debtors and Creditors 453-54 (7th ed. 2014).
56· Lest the uninitiated reader worry Congress went wild with section 365, she
should be assuaged by the provisions that incorporate common law bars on assignment, such as an inability to assign "personal" contracts. See II U.S.C. J 365(c)(1) (2012).
57 Post v. Sigel & Co., Ltd. (In re Sigel & Co., Ltd.), 923 F.2d 142, 145-46 (9th Cir. 1991)
(rejecting counterparty's argument that contract's non-executoriness precluded
debtor assumption under section 365).
53. II
54 ·
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But in cases in which the contract was burdensome for the debtor
(and hence good for the counterparty), the counterparty would then
argue that the contract was not executory and, therefore, could not
be rejected.58 Note the bizarre logic under this reasoning, as some
courts blithely pronounced: if "the contract is not executory, ... [it is]
neither assumable nor capable of rejection." 59 A contract that neither
can be assumed nor rejected creates an existential legal crisis, which
some have described as "zombie" contracts that leave the debtor in a
"legal limbo. "6o Many a court caught in the middle of an executoriness fight would make the initial decision, whether the contract was
indeed executory or not, and then simply hide from the consequence
of a finding of non-executoriness, presumably hoping the parties
would just sort out amongst themselves what to do next in this limbo.6' Court after court, right up to the circuit level, has continued to
struggle.62 And debtors, too, flounder over just what they can do in a
world of uncertain executoriness.63
sll- For example, Lycoming Engines v. Superior Air Parts, Inc. (In re Superior Air Parts),
486 B.R. 728, 738 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2012) ("[W]hen a contract is non-executory, the
debtor remains bound to its obligations."); In re Spectrum Info. Techs., Inc., 193 B.R.
400, 403 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting creditor's objection that the "[a]greement is
not an 'executory contract' ... and, therefore, not subject to rejection").
59· In re Hawker Beechcraft, Inc., 486 B.R. 264, 276 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013). These
cases are legion: "This Court has already ruled that the Settlement Agreement is
not executory, and therefore the Debtor could not reject it. Likewise, since it is not
an executory contract, the Debtor cannot assume it." In re Airwest Int'l, Inc., No.
86-00145, 1988 WL 113101, at *3 (Bankr. D. Haw. Oct. 12, 1988).
00• See Westbrook & White, supra note 6, at 482 ("We propose an end to zombie
contracts and the obsolete notions that keep them upright by abolishing the 'material breach' rule."); Westbrook, supra note 3, at 239.
6L For example, In re Interstate Bakeries Corp., 751 F.3d 955, 964 (8th Cir. 2014)
(limiting itself to declaration ofnon~executoriness); In re S.A. Holding Co., LLC, 357
B.R. 51, 59 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2006) (same).
62 · "Because section 365 applies only to executory contracts, a debtor-in-possession does not have the option of rejecting or assuming non-executory contracts and
remains bound by the debtor's obligations under those contracts after the bankruptcy filing." Stewart Foods, Inc. v. Broecker (In re Stewart Foods, Inc.), 64 F.3d 141,
145 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting elsewhere in its opinion that the consequence of deemed
continuation is the same as assumption).
63- For example, In re Sudbury, Inc., 153 B.R. 776, 776 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993)
(seeking to avoid unwelcome contract by arguing in the alternative either it was
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"Executoriness," a little textual throwaway from the Chandler Act
era's amendments clarifying archaic provability issues, has now become
the hook of one of bankruptcy law's most intractable (and pointless)
sources of jurisprudential confusion-What is an "executory" contract
in bankruptcy that the debtor can subject to section 365?64

C.

Traditional Responses to Executoriness's
Problems

1. D'tfinir,g Executoriness: Countryman and the
Material Breach Test

This brings us back to Vern Countryman. Neither the Act nor the
Code defined "executory," perhaps thinking it too obvious.65 An
important academic figure in the development of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, Countryman propounded a widespread test that now
bears his name for whether a contract is executory. Under Countryman's definition, a contract is executory if both parties have
sufficient unperformed obligations so that either's discontinuance
would constitute a material breach, hence the label "material breach"
test. 66 Courts loved the test's seeming simplicity, although only a few
openly recognized that it just pushed litigation onto the "materiality" prong.67
executory and would be rejected or it was non-executory and therefore incapable
of assumption).
64· An interesting, but ultimately unhelpful, Supreme Court foray into this riddle
is Central Tablet Mfg. Co. v. United States, 417 U.S. 673 (1974), which attempted to
distinguish "executoryn from "executed.n Id. at 684-85, n.7.
65· In the adoption of the Code in 1978, Congress candidly admitted it had no
definition of"executory.n H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 347 (1977) ("Though there is no
precise definition of what contracts are executory, it generally includes contracts
on which performance remains due to some extent on both sides. n) (Source text is
entirely capitalized.).
66• Countryman I, supra note 4, at 460.
67· See Chattanooga Mem7 Park v. Still (In re Jolly), 547 F.2d 349, 350-51 (6th Cir.
1978) (noting that material breach test does "not resolve this [executoriness] problem"). The zenith of confusion over "materialityn of remaining obligations-and
hence the make-or-break point on executoriness-likely arises in the intellectual property cases with licensing agreements. Westbrook and White assemble a
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The material breach test does indeed work well for many simple contracts, but problems arise with more nuanced arrangements.
Take, for example, option contracts, where the debtor merely holds a
valuable option to purchase Blackacre for a favorable price. Lacking
an obligation ever to exercise the option, the debtor could scarcely
be said to commit a "material breach" (or any breach) should she
decline to exercise it. Under the Countryman test, this option contract would not be executory and hence could not fall under section 365 with its power to assume. 68 Counterparty-optioners who
made bad deals were quick to make this argument in their debtor's
bankruptcy cases, convincing courts accepting the Countryman test
that the debtor simply could not assume the option as it could not fall
under section 365(a). 69 Other problematic examples abound, including the chimerical rights hanging over a departed employee with a
noncompete clause in her (erstwhile) employment contract. Clearly
the employer had no remaining obligations that could be materially
breached, even though the employee clearly did. The Countryman
test said the noncompete was no longer an executory contract, and
thus the debtor could not reject it under section 365, meaning the
debtor-employee remained somehow permanently saddled with
a de facto nondischargeable obligation.70 And so on. Indeed, courts
often resorted to "analytical gymnast[ics]" to find contracts executory (or not) in order to bring them under (or outside) section 365's
scope to achieve just results.7'
considerable footnote showing the demoralizing conflict in case law over materiality in this domain. See Westbrook & White, supra note 6, at 508 n.141, 504 n.125.
68 · For example, Travelodge int'/, Inc. v. Cont'l Props., Inc. (In re Cont'! Props., Inc.), 15
B.R. 732, 736 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1981) ("Since the Agreement is an option contract and
not an executory contract, it cannot be assumed.").
69 · For example, lntermet Realty P'ship v. First Pa. Bank (In re lntermet Realty P'ship),
26 B.R. 383, 388 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983) ("There is no interest which could be termed
an executory contract and assumed by the debtor.").
70 · See, e.g., In re Spooner, No. rr-31525, 2012 WL 909515, at *3 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio Mar. 16, 2012) (finding a noncompete contract not executory and hence
un-rejectable).
7'- Bronner v. Chenoweth-Massie P'ship (In re Nat'/ Fin. Realty Tr.), 226 B.R. 586,
589 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1998). Compare In re lchiban, Case No. 06-10316-RGM,
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2. Bae/clash: Westbrooks CallforAbolition

The seminal scholar to confront the problems of the executoriness
doctrine and the Countryman test was Westbrook, who advocated
the simplest solution: abolishing the executoriness requirement
altogether and refocusing attention on the section 365(a) question
whether the debtor's business decision to assume or reject a contract should survive judicial scrutiny.7 For what one assumes was
branding purposes, Westbrook felt compelled to style his abolitionist argument a "functionalist" approach to defining executoriness,
even going so far as suggesting courts could fit his approach into
existing case law.73 More specifically, Westbrook initially said the test
of whether a contract is executory is whether there is an economic
benefit to assuming or rejecting it for the estate.74 He then clarified
in subsequent writing that the assumed precondition of the definition of executory is the historical common law definition-Le.,
whether there was literally any performance, by any party, anywhere, left under the contract that still had to be done.75 Stripped
bare, Westbrook's position was not really an interpretation of executoriness at all; it was a compelling normative argument to purge the
2

2014 WL 2937088, at *1-2 (Bankr. E.D. Va. June 30, 2014) (finding that seemingly
trivial notice and appraisal provisions, while contingent, are sufficiently material for remaining ongoing obligations to render LLC agreement executory),
with In re Knowles, No. 6:11-bk-11717-KSJ, 2013 WL 152434, at *4 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. Jan. 15, 2013) (contending that similar provisions are too remote to be material remaining obligations and so contract is non-executory). In In re Drake, 136
B.R. 325, 325 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992), the trustee argued in the alternative that
the employee-debtor's noncompete agreement was either non-executory and,
therefore, could not be rejected or executory and, therefore, could be assumed
and assigned!
72 • Westbrook, supra note 3, at 230 (advocating "abolishing the requirement of
executoriness altogether").
73 · See id. at 327 ("[f]he functional approach fits neatly within the existing structure and the detailed provisions of the Code.").
74• Id. at 253 (delineating "Net Value" calculus in bankruptcy).
75• 1 Samuel Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts section 1:19 (4th ed.
2007) (observing that courts identify an executory contract as "a contract, the obligation of which relates to the future, or a contract under which the parties have
bound themselves to future activity that is not yet completed or performed.").
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executoriness requirement.76 Some courts bit,77 but for many, it was
a bridge too far.7 8
3. Doubling Down: Tl,,e ABI Commissions Retrenchment

Despite some enthusiastic takers, Westbrook's alternative never
gained the traction of the Countryman test. True, the recent ABI
Commission's Expert Group right out of the gates took Westbrook's
abolitionist argument as its first recommendation for improvements
to the Code on the topic of executory contracts.79 The Commission, however, rejected this suggestion, preferring instead the "welldeveloped" case law on executoriness, because it provides guidance to
parties and courts.80 In fact, the Commission recommended codifying the Countryman test into law, cheerfully burying the vexing questions of options, noncompetes, and other difficult contract cases into
an encyclopedic footnote to its report, 81 vying for the 2014 Understatement of the Year Award in admitting that courts "struggled" and
the test produced inconsistencies. 82 But the decision was not just
motivated by pedigree. Lying just beneath, or even at the surface,
was a naked distributive concern: that section 365 accords too much
power to the debtor, and so the executoriness wrinkle serves a "gating
feature" function that allows some counterparties to win arguments
on executoriness grounds that prevent a debtor from gaining access
to section 365 and taking action that the counterparty dreads. 83
76· He eventually came clean. Westbrook & White, supra note 6, at 484 n.16
("Functional Analysis was not an approach to determining executoriness, but a proposal to abandon executoriness all together as a threshold test.").
77· See, e.g., In re Bayou Shores SNF, LLC, 525 B.R 160, 168 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2014)
(finding the contract executory under the functional approach and Countryman test).
78· See, e.g., Butler v. Resident Care Innovation Corp., 241 B.R. 37, 44 (D.R.l. 1999)
(criticizing functional analysis as "ignor[ing] the statutory mandate that the contract be executory").
79· See ABI Advisory Committee, supra note 13.
80· See ABI Report, supra note 8.
81· Id. at 113 n.416.

s2.
83 ·

Id.
Id. at 115 (bemoaning the "unfair[ness]" abolition of executoriness would visit

on counterparties).
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Even leaving aside the vividness bias of the Commission's
concern-focusing on the highly visible plight of the counterparty
succumbing to the debtor's power under section 365 to the ignorance
of the more diffuse benefit to all other stakeholders ofthe estate aided
by that debtor's adroit treatment of a contract-the primary objection to the retention of executoriness as a "gating" valve is that the
concept lacks normative coherence or principle. (Westbrook himself
witheringly agrees.)84 Similar gatekeeping could arise by saying the
judge gets to flip a coin and each time it's heads the debtor can't use
section 365. That, too, would reduce the power of the debtor, but not
in a way that any well-designed legal system would consider tolerable. A principled way to reduce debtor leverage would be to accord
greater discretion to the judge under section 365(a), perhaps tacking
on an ability to deny rejection or assumption if it would be inequitable under the circumstances, but that's a topic for another day. 85
Nonetheless, the Commission has doubled down on executoriness,
suggesting it should stay in the Code as a beacon for litigious contractual counterparties.86

III. A Better Approach to Executoriness:
Ta.king Non-Executoriness Seriously
A. Sharpening the Debate
To find a way out of this mess, we need a new approach. Let us consider the two archetypal contracts for which the debtor is likely to
face an executoriness challenge. As mnemonic, we can use aviary
labels: first, the unwanted "albatross" that the debtor wants to drop
84· The Commission retained executoriness as a safety valve on debtor abuse "at
the sacrifice oflogic and, more importantly, predictable commercial results." Westbrook & White, supra note 6, at 486-87.
31. Westbrook and White would seem to agree. Id. at 486.
86· ABI Report, supra note 8, at 114 (noting litigation experience of some ABI
Commissioners).
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like a hot potato but the counterparty seeks to cast as non-executory,
hoping that doing so will stymie the debtor's rejection efforts by barring access to section 365 (and its rejection powers); and second, the
coveted "golden goose" that the debtor is desperate to keep but the
counterparty also seeks to cast as non-executory to similarly stymie
the debtor's assumption by foreclosing section 365 (and its assumption powers). Think of a hot realty option to scoop up Blackacre for
a song: it's a golden goose for the option holder; it's an albatross for
the option granter.
1. The Ea.sy Ca.se: The Non-Executory Golden Goose
{Without Default)

Let's start with the golden goose contract that the debtor wishes to
keep, which, for even further simplicity, we'll assume is not in default.
Suppose the counterparty challenges executoriness. If the debtor
wins on the executoriness argument, the contract is assumed under
section 365. Ifthe debtor loses, the contract cannot be assumed under
section 365. But what does that mean? The non-executory contract
is still property-best thought of as a chose in action to sue for the
debtor's rights under the contract. 87 More accurately, it is hybrid
property conjoining the debtor's right to enforce the contract benefits with the deleterious obligations to perform that the counterparty
can translate into a claim if breached under section 502. 88 Thus, formally, the contract-qua-hybrid property passes to the estate under
section 541's capacious reach to "all legal or equitable interests of the
debtor in property."89 This allows the debtor to enjoy its economic

87· The Act provided for "rights of action arising upon contracts," 30 Stat. 565
(1898), amended by 66 Stat. 429 (1952), II U.S.C. § no(a)(5) (1958), and "property,
including rights of action," id., as property of the estate.
88· Technically, the acceleration of all claims, n U.S.C. § 101(5) (2012), means that
the liabilities crystallize as well so as to permit comprehensive discharge. But that is
of no moment when the debtor wishes to assume.
89- Id. section 541(a)(1).
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benefit as property of the estate.90 All this is done irrespective of section 365. Thus, at least in the absence of default, whether the contract is executory or not has no effect on the debtor's exploitation
of the economic rights; section 365, and a fortiori "executoriness," is
irrelevant. 91
2. The Harder Case: The Non-Executory Alhatross

The albatross is where things start to get complicated. lf the debtor
wants to reject an unwanted contract, but the counterparty launches
an executoriness challenge, the debtor faces more of a hurdle. Again,
if the debtor wins, no problem and the contract is rejected under section 365(a). But if the counterparty succeeds in arguing the contract
is non-executory and hence cannot be rejected under section 365,
what happens? In a thoughtful historical discussion, Michael
Andrew noted that under prior American and English practice, the
undesirable contract never entered into the bankruptcy estate in the
first place-it was "excluded," because unless and until a receiver or
an assignee accepted debtor property under the Act, the historical
abandonment doctrine left the estate unscathed. 92 Whatever the
historical accuracy of his argument (and it does appear accurate),93
Andrew's "exclusionary" approach now seems outdated given the
1978 Code's intentional inclusivity through the expanded definition
of claim, where everything is included in the estate to enable comprehensive resolution of financial distress.
90 · Countryman indirectly accepted this reasoning. Countryman I, supra note 4,
at458-59.
9 '· See, e.g., Warner v. Warner (In re Warner), 480 B.R. 641, 652, 6s5 (Bankr. N.D.W.
Va. 2012) (LLC agreement that was not executory still entered the bankruptcy estate
under section 541); Ehmann v. Fiesta Inv., LLC (In re Ehmann), 3r9 B.R. 200, 206
(Bankr. D. Ariz. 2005) (same).
92· See Andrew, Rejection, supra note 11, at 881 (noting that courts "excluded
'executory' contract and lease assets from the bankruptcy estate ... absent an election by the trustee to accept them").
93 · For example, Copeland v. Stephens (1818), 106 Eng. Rep. 218, 222 (KB) (holding
title to leases and contracts does not pass to estate unless "accepted").
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Many courts struggle with the non-executory albatross, assuming
that it nevertheless persists if it is unable to be rejected under section 365(a).94 Yet a contract is still a contract, and even if it cannot be
rejected under section 365, it can still be repudiated. Moreover, bankruptcy courts do not generally order specific performance against the
trustee (due to the innocence of the other creditors from the debtor's
prior acts). 95 Thus, for most contracts, the only real remedy for the
counterparty from debtor repudiation is a breach claim for damages. 96
Now, under formal rejection of an executory contract via section
365, the Code specifies that the counterparty has a provable unsecured damages claim relating back to the petition date. 97 But if the
contract is non-executory and the debtor wants to repudiate, courts
become flummoxed, most apparently implying (hoping?) that the
debtor has to perform. 98 Andrew, of course, solves this problem by
having the albatross never enter the estate in the first place and so
not be a problem for the trustee (but then presumably also being
not provable, taking us back to the unhappy, old days). Yet, there is
94· For example, In re Capital Acquisitions & Mgmt. Corp., 341 B.R. 632, 637
(Banlcr. N.D. ill. 2006) (finding LLC operating agreement non-executory and thus
"enforceable" in bankruptcy).
95- See, e.g., In re Pina, 363 B.R. 314, 333-35 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) (refusing to
enforce prepetition injunctive judgment where it would harm unsecured creditors
by diminishing size of bankruptcy estate); ABI Report, supra note 8, at II9 ("[R]ejection of an executory contract or unexpired lease should not ... entitle the nonbreaching, nondebtor party to a right of specific performance.").
96· For simplicity, this chapter will assume all breach claims are reducible to
damages to avoid the sidebar of can-be-compelled-to-accept-monetary-judgment
issues. II U.S.C. I ro1(5)(B) (2012). Critically for bankruptcy, these damages will never
be compensatory for the counterparty if paid with the general unsecured dividend.
Thus, in an idealized contract world of frictionless damages awards, a counterparty
would be economically indifferent to performance or breach-remedied-by-full-expectation damages. Not so in bankruptcy, where any damage award (absent priority)
will be paid out for pennies on the dollar. Westbrook, supra note 3, at 253 (labeling,
one feels gleefully, the discounted bankruptcy dividend as "little tiny Bankruptcy
Dollars").
97. II U.S.C. J 365(g)(1) (2012).
98· For example, In re KBAR, Inc., 96 B.R. 158, 159-60 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1988) (holding Hardee's franchise agreement to be no longer executory and hence its covenants
could not be rejected in bankruptcy but rather remained in full force).
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a plausible argument that cannot be ignored: if the debtor demurs
performance of such a contract, the breach claim becomes an administrative charge against the estate entitled to priority repayment. 99
The argument for priority status of a non-executory contract's
abandonment damages goes something like this. Everyone agrees
that if the debtor assumes an executory contract under section 365
and then subsequently breaches, the breach damages are administrative expenses of running the estate; that's in the Code. 100 Just as the
trustee has to pay utility bills postpetition, if the trustee enters into
a contract postpetition, so too does that business expense become a
cost of running the estate that is entitled to administrative priority.101
An assumed executory contract is no different from a new contract
entered into postpetition: it's a cost of running the show that the
trustee willingly incurs on the calculus that the benefits outweigh
the burdens (the same way most trustees find paying the electric bill
worth it to keep the lights on).
Following my formalism on the golden goose discussed previously, however, if the contract is somehow non-executory, it still has
to go somewhere, under the doctrine of Conservation of Contractual
Mass. lt must, therefore, enter the estate under section 541 automatically. Thus, the trustee must dispose of it as estate property to get rid
of it (in this case, repudiate the contract and give rise to a concomitant breach claim). Since this abandonment occurs postpetition, it
must be another cost of running the estate (think of it as paying the
garbage collector to haul off unwanted debris). Ergo, the breach damages are also an administrative expense, just as with an executory
contract the trustee assumes but later breaches. 102 The only difference
99 See rr U.S.C. J 507(a)(2) (2012) (priority repayment status for administrative
claims); id. section 365(g)(2) (conferring administrative status on post-assumption
breach claims).
wo. Id. section 365(g)(2).
w, Id. section 503(b)(1).
10 •· The counterparty tried this tack in In re Airwest lnt'l, Inc., No. 86-00145, 1988
WL n3101 (Bankr. D. Haw. Oct. 12, 1988), but the court held it was "premature" to
adjudicate the priority claim pending assessment whether postpetition conduct by
the debtor was tortious. Id. at *3.
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here from section 365 is that this de facto assumption prior to rejection is purely involuntary and never approved by the bankruptcy
court.103 This prospect of favored priority helps explain why a counterparty to an albatross seeks a declaration of non-executoriness.
The first best position, of course, is to trick the court into thinking
that exclusion from section 365 simply ends the discussion and the
debtor is just out ofluck and must go on performing forever; but the
nearly as attractive fallback position is to say that if such a non-executory contract is rejected, the breach damages must be treated as
administrative claims entitled to first priority payout. 104
3. The Hardest Case: Non-Executory Golden Goose
( with Default)

Finally, let us return to the golden goose, which we discovered is easy
for the debtor to retain when we assume the absence of default. But
if we relax that assumption and put the debtor in default, then we see
the incentive to fight over executoriness. The power to cure defaults
effectively neutralizes the state law contract rights of the counterparty to respond to a material breach with the self-help remedy oftermination by forcing the counterparty to accept the debtor's cure and
keep the contract alive. 105 This allows, by federal preemptive power
of the Code, a debtor to resurrect a slain golden goose (or more
precisely, resuscitate a mortally wounded one). If the contract is
103• Compare II U.S.C. J 541(a)(1) (no approval required for automatic vesting of
the estate with all the debtor's property), with id. section 365(a) (requiring court
approval for assumption).
rn+ Note that absent recognized property rights, they will not prevail in an action
against the debtor for specific performance in a bankruptcy court. For a good property rights analysis case, see In re Walter Energy, Inc., No. 15-02741-TOMn, 2015
WL 9487718, at *6 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Dec. 28, 2015). See also In re Plascencia, 354
B.R 774, 780 (Bankr. E.D. Va 2006) (holding that a recorded realty option created a
non-rejectable property interest).
105· The muscular cure power of section 365(b) can be contrasted with the limited
cases where cure is allowed at state law. See, e.g., U.C.C. section 2-508 cmt. 2 (Am.
Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm'n 2014) (explaining the limited power to cure in saleof-goods contracts if"circumstances" justify).
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non-executory, however, and simply sitting in the debtor's lap under
section 541, then unless we find a power elsewhere in the Code, there
is no cure power of section 365(b) to preserve that contract's innate
value to the debtor. Thus, we can encapsulate the golden goose
problem as one of no express power to cure. And indeed, we can fret
further by noting an ipso facto clause-providing for the contract
to terminate automatically upon filing for bankruptcy-would also
escape section 365(e)'s invalidation provision if the contract falls outside that subsection's scope as non-executory.
To summarize, there seem to be both primary and secondary counterparty advantages incentivizing executoriness challenges. For albatrosses, which the counterparty says are non-rejectable, the primary
advantage is to trick a debtor or court into requiring performance,
period, while the secondary advantage is priority status payment for
breach damages in the event of non-performance/rejection/abandonment/repudiation-whatever we want to call it. The primary
advantage to the counterparty for golden geese in arguing they are
non-assumable is tricking the debtor into just giving up on the contract, while the secondary advantage is to block the cure power of
section 365(b). I now seek to demonstrate through a proper understanding of the Code's text and structure that these claimed advantages are not just theoretically repugnant to the Code but doctrinally
unsupportable (or at the very least, are not doctrinally preordained).
B. Entering the Debate: Working Through the Code
on Non-Executoriness

We have here identified the three paradigmatic cases of nonexecutory contracts in ascending order oflegal complexity and now
turn to what I contend is their proper treatment under the Code if
we take the concept of a non-executory contract seriously (i.e., not
as a show-stopper whose declaration magically truncates further
discussion).
As previously discussed, the first scenario is easy: a golden goose
not in default. Consider, for example, a valuable unexpired option
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held by the debtor that the optioner wishes to evade. The optioner
argues that the option cannot possibly be an "executory" contract due
to its flunking the Countryman test (as there would be no material
breach if the debtor did nothing until the end of time). The optioner
then drops the second shoe and argues that because it is not executory, the option cannot fall under section 365 and, therefore, cannot be assumed under section 365(a). Poof! It disappears as a debtor
asset. Commentators have struggled to shoehorn the option into the
Countryman test,1°6 but the simpler solution, contra Westbrook, is
to concede that it is not an executory contract. As discussed earlier,
however, it cannot just vanish. The unexpired option still exists as
inchoate "property of the estate" under section 541 1107 just as a lien is
an inchoate twig in the bundle of rights. As such, the debtor need do
nothing with regards to this property. If the optioner ever asks the
debtor whether the option is "assumed," the debtor can just respond
she no more needs to assume the option than she needs to assume
the drill press in the factory: it's all valuable property of the estate to
be deployed in due course.108
m6. Andrew, Reply to Westbrook, supra note n, at 32-34. This is a frequent problem with insurance cases, in which the prepaid premium seems to discharge the
insured's obligations, and so when the unexpired policy needs to be assumed, the
debtor-insured will point to all the purportedly executory remaining duties to
cooperate, i.e., to assure executoriness. See, e.g., Pester Ref Co. v. Ins. Co. N. Am. (In
re Pester Ref Co.), 58 B.R. 189, 191 (Banlcr. S.D. lowa 1985) (finding the contract to be
executory).
107· See, e.g., BNY, Capital Funding LLC v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 345 B.R. 549, 556
(Banlcr. E.D. Va. 2006) ("As an unexercised option, the LOl was property of U.S. Airways's banlcruptcy estate.").
IOS. Unlike section 365(a), section 541's automatic vesting of the non-executory
golden goose will not give the counterparty definitive notice of its legal obligations-a policy some argue is an important bankruptcy one. See, e.g., Westbrook &
White, supra note 6, at 518 (asserting that notice to counterparties is necessary to
promote fairness). But so what? What notice is needed for a happy counterparty
whose contract is not in default-that the contract is continuing to be performed
uneventfully as it has been all along? Let that tree fall in the forest! Accordingly, I am
unsympathetic to the optioner in Bronner v. Chenoweth-Massie P'ship (In re Nat'l Fin.
Realty Tr.), 226 B.R. 586 (Banlcr. W.D. Ky. 1998). That optioner was left uncertain
whether an option had been assumed or rejected after broken-off negotiations, mistakenly assuming/hoping it was rejected only to be surprised two years later when
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1. Abandoning the Albatross
a.

The Power

What about the converse situation of a burdensome contract that the
debtor wants to run screaming from? Here, we might flip the debtor
to be the optioner in the prior example, or consider an erstwhile
employee-debtor laboring under a noncompete clause. The counterparty/option holder now argues that the contract flunks Countryman, so it cannot be rejected pursuant to section 365(a), because of
course it doesn't fall under section 365's purview. Noncompete cases
are notorious for accepting this view (probably because the court
thinks the debtor is trying to pull a fast one by weaseling out of a noncompete clause), and so these cases simply say that the clause somehow "remains valid."109 But the proper answer, doctrinally, lies again
in remembering that, formally, the wart-laden contract is the property
of the estate under section 541-but that the trustee can abandon the
property under section 554, which provides that "[a]fter notice and a
hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of the estate that is
burdensome to the estate.""0 To be sure, a contract is a curious hybrid
form of property conjoining an asset (the chose in action to compel
the benefit of the bargain) with a liability (a claim for the consideration the debtor owes). Abandonment of the property on the asset
side of the ledger does not "vaporize □" the counterparty's claim on the

a third party exercised the option. Id. at 588-90. If the clear default rule is that contracts pass to the estate and remain there unless and until rejected under section
365 or abandoned under section 554, then the counterparty has legal certainty and
knows it has a duty to pester.
109· Jenson v. Cont'l Fin. Corp., 591 F.2d 477, 482 (8th Cir. 1979) (holding that "the
security agreement is not executory," and thus it "remains valid"); see also, e.g., Meiburger v. Endeka Enters. (In re Tsiaoushis), 383 B.R. 616, 621 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007)
(concluding that an operating agreement was not executory and thus its sections
remained "valid and fully enforceable"); Ready Prod., Inc. v. Jarvis (In re Jarvis), No.
04-10806-JMD, 2005 WL 758805, at *5 (Bankr. D.N.H. Mar. 28, 2005) (finding the
noncompete agreement non-executory and non-rejectable in granting employerplaintiff injunctive relief against employee-debtor).
no. II U.S.C. section 554(a) (2012),
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liability side,m of course, but that truism does not undermine the
debtor's absolute power under section 554 to abandon the albatross.
Once again, section 365 is never needed. Courts seem to underappreciate the role of section 554 in this context.n3 Even courts that get
to the right result do not seem to understand how they are getting
there.n4
112

h. The Claim.

Thus, the debtor can happily abandon a non-executory contract
under section 554, without need to address section 365 and its executoriness gate at all. This, of course, is a breach (formally an anticipatory repudiation, but the result is the same). But that conclusion
Sunbeam Prods. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 2012).
u,. I leave to one side the concern of seasoned practitioners of "inadvertent"

m.

assumption. True, automatic vesting under section 541 does not require an overt
act, as does section 365, to check mistaken albatross acquisition, but neither does
deemed rejection under section 365(d) protect against inadvertent rejection. In other
words, there is no intrinsically "safe" default rule. The choice is between a default
rule, with the attendant risks of carelessness, see Ebert v. DeVries Family Farm, LLC
(In re DeVries), No. 12-04015-DML, 2014 WL 4294540, at *14 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Aug.
27, 2014) (finding that because trustee never assumed, section 365(d) deemed executory contract rejected), or the ambiguous quagmire of no default specification, see
Proc. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Greystone 111 Joint Venture (In re Greystone 111 Joint Venture),
995 F.2d 1274, 1281 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that the chapter u debtor's leases continue-and the lessees have no provable claim against the bankruptcy estate-when
the debtor neither assumes nor rejects its leases with third parties).
'13- For example, In re FBI Distribution Corp. simply declares that the postpetition breach of a non-executory contract gives rise to an unsecured prepetition
claim, a result I find congenial, but with no reference to section 554. Mason v. Offidal
Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re FBI Distrib. Corp.), 330 F,3d 36, 48 (1st Cir. 2003).
'LI• Discussion of section 554 is frequently lacking in these cases. See, e.g., In re
Majestic Capital, Ltd., 463 B.R. 289, 301-02 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (using non-executoriness to prevent priority treatment of burdensome severance package, yet nonetheless "grant[ing] the motion to reject"); In re Exide Techs., 378 B.R. 762, 766 (Bankr.
D. Del. 2007) (using non-executoriness to prevent debtor from having inadvertently
assumed expensive retirement agreement). Andrew, in defending his exclusionary
approach, embraces the abandonment power. See Andrew, Rejection, supra note n,
at 863 (noting that rejection and abandonment both result in "exclusion of an asset
from the estate"). And in a footnote, he seems to agree with the core of my analysis.
Id. at 890 n.165.
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avoids the harder question of what befalls the counterparty's claim
that is engendered by such a breach. "5 There are three possibilities:
the counterparty has no claim; the counterparty has a general unsecured claim; or the counterparty has an administrative priority claim.
The first possibility arises from the Swiftian reasoning that if section
365 does not apply, then presumably section 365(g)(r)'s conferral of
the unsecured claim upon the aggrieved counterparty cannot kick
in. One doubts the executoriness-denying counterparties intend
this to be the logical consequence of their executoriness victory. Nor
is it a plausible outcome because it would require de-coupling the
contract's liabilities from its assets, a result unseemly to bankruptcy
jurisprudence and common sense.n6
Therefore, there must be some form of damages claim filable by
the aggrieved counterparty for the rejection breach. But what sort
of claim? Recall that if this were an executory contract breach claim,
the Code's clear text of section 365(g)(r) designates it as a general
unsecured one. n 7 Why a different result for a non-executory contract?
Recall further the reasoning discussed previously that deems the
" 5 Andrew's "exclusionary" approach led to the cumbersome conclusion that
such contracts would revert to the debtor (not estate) and plausibly give a claim
against the debtor for breach that might not be discharged by the debtor's bankruptcy. Andrew, Rejection, supra note n, at 863.
" 6 · See Century lndem. Co. v. Nat'/ Gypsum Co. Settlement Tr. (ln re Nat'/ Gypsum),
208 F.3d 498, 506 (sth Cir. 2000) ("Where the debtor assumes an executory contract,
it must assume the entire contract, cum onere-the debtor accepts both the obligations and the benefits of the executory contract.").
" 7• II U.S.C. j 365(g)(1) (2012). What's interesting about section 365(g)(1) is that
its retroactive designation of the claim as occurring prepetition, id. section 502(g),
appears to be textually necessary to render the counterparty an estate "creditor." Id.
section 101(1o)(A). Would the non-executory breach counterparty, unable to rely on
these relation-back provisions, not be able to be a "creditor"? Although little seems
to ride on it for the debtor (as the counterparty still holds a dischargeable "claim," id.
section 524(a)(2), u41(d)(1)(A)), the counterparty may face some grief under section
726. But it appears to be of little moment: courts routinely consider the non-executory breach counterparty to have a claim under section 502 and seem to muddle
through just fine. See, e.g., In re FBI Distrib. Corp., supra note u3, at 48 (holding the
postpetition breach of non-executory contract triggered the prepetition claim as a
"contingent claim... [even though] the right to payment arises during the reorganization when the contingency occurs"); Stewart Foods, Inc. v. Broecker (In re Stewart
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breach as if the contract had been assumed and then rejected by the
estate. Everyone agrees that that is a priority claim (a stance codified in section 365(g)(2)).118 If, however, we accept the logic from the
golden goose scenario discussed earlier that a non-executory contract vests in the estate automatically by section 541 without need
to resort to section 365 at all, then we are faced with the necessary
sauce for the gander that to abandon it the debtor must abandon
property of the estate-hybrid property that carries an appurtenant
claim for damages. Thus, since the estate is doing the abandoning
that gives rise to the breach claim, the breach claim should be a cost
of the estate's doing business, and hence entitled to administrative priority.n9 Viewed this way, section 365(g)(1) is not so much the
conferral of provability (that it historically was) but a dispensation
withdrawing the presumptive administrative priority of an estate
breach claim. Closing the textual circle on this reasoning, because
section 365(g)(1) demotes the breach claim to "mere" unsecured status for executory contracts, the lack of a similar demotion clause
elsewhere in the Code for non-executory contracts means, just as
Andrew feared, that the breach claim against the estate could be
deemed to trigger administrative expense priority. 120
Textual checkmate? Hardly. The solution lies in fighting text with
text. And here I have the advantage of the Code's actual language,
which Countryman did not have in 1973. The incursion of expenses
postpetition is a necessary condition for administrative expenses

Foods, Inc.), 64 F.3d 141, 143, 145 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding counterparty had prepetition

claim for postpetition breach of stipulated non-executory contract).
" 8· Congress either caps this intrinsically beneficial claim or deems it administrative notwithstanding its lack of benefit (depending on one's perspective) for certain
leases. rr U.S.C. J 503(b)(7) (2012).
n 9. Andrew noted that the historic Copeland case may have been animated
(wrongly, in his view) by this very concern. Andrew, Rejection, supra note n, at 85963 ("[The Copeland concept's] premise, that the estate would become liable merely
by succeeding to a contract or lease, was not clearly correct.").
" 0 • Id. at 860 ("The courts in these pre-statutory cases thus identified contracts
and leases as assets having the perceived potential of imposing administrative liabilities upon the estate by virtue of its succession to the debtor's ownership.").
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under section 503(b) of the Code. 121 But postpetition timing, while
necessary, is not sufficient. Rather, we must take cognizance of the
Code's insistence of administrative expenses being "actual" and "necessary,"122 and as textually inclined courts inform us:
The modifiers "actual'' and "necessary" must be observed with scrupulous care[,] because [o]ne of the goals of chapter II is to keep administrative costs to a minimum in order to preserve the debtor's scarce
resources and thus encourage rehabilitation. In keeping with this goal,
section 503(b)(1)(A) was not intended to saddle debtors with special postpetition obligations lightly or give preferential treatment to certain select
creditors by creating a broad category of administrative expenses. 123
Here, the trustee/DIP as fiduciary of the estate has no desire for
the counterparty's services. They are not an insurance premium that
preserves valuable property the estate wishes to realize. Nor are they
taxes, that necessary evil levied on that valuable property, which are
also explicitly provided for in section 503.124 Rather, they are the dead
hand of the past, clamoring for a leg up on other creditors, offending
bankruptcy's policy of equality.125 But what is even more important
121 · Section 503(b) deals with expenses of the estate, which are given priority under
section 507(a)(2). 11 U.S.C. J 503(b), 507(a)(2) (2012).
122• Id. section (b)(1)(A). See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Dobbins, 35 F.3d 860, 866-68
(4th Cir. 1994) (holding that "actual and necessary" costs must stem from affirmative
use, as opposed to mere passive possession, of estate property by the debtor and such
use must provide concrete, as opposed to merely potential, benefit to the estate).
123· Dobbins, 35 F.3d at 866 (alterations in original) (internal citations and quotations omitted) (quoting General Amer. Transp. Corp. v. Martin (In re Mid Region Petroleum, Inc.), 1 F.3d 1130, 1134 (10th Cir. 1993)).
l24- II u.s.c. J 503(b)(1)(B) (2012).
125• See Dobbins, 35 F.3d at 865 (quoting ln re James B. Downing & Co., 94 B.R.
515, 519 (Bankr. N.D. ill. 1988) ("The presumption in bankruptcy cases is that the
debtor's limited resources will be equally distributed among the creditors. Thus,
statutory priorities must be narrowly construed.")). A strand of jurisprudence has
evolved involving environmental liabilities for burdensome property the debtor
abandons postpetition under section 554. Some courts have not allowed administrative priority precisely because of the lack of benefit to the estate. See, e.g., ln re H.F.
Radandt, lnc., 160 B.R. 323, 327 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1993) (Section 503 "mandate[s] that
[administrative priority] be granted where necessary to 'preserve' the estate," and
"preservation [would not] be accomplished by granting [administrative priority to
environmental cleanup]"). But many have tagged the debtor with cleanup costs as an
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is that the estate never receives any benefit from the rejected contract and its related breach daim. This observation is critical to contrast the situation from that where the debtor affirmatively assumes
an executory contract (thus enjoying some benefit from it) and then
subsequently breaches it There, the estate has, however fleetingly,
enjoyed some "actual" and "necessary" usage of the contract and must
pay the piper for its attendant costs in the event of breach.126 With
this non-executory contract, by contrast, the unwanted property automatically vested into the estate over the debtor's howling, and the
debtor abandoned it at the first possible moment.127 Accordingly, the
seeming analogy between the assumed-and-subsequently-rejected
(executory) contract and the automatically-vested-but-never-wantedand-quickly-abandoned (non-executory) contract falls apart128 The sim-

administrative priority. See, e.g., United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.),
944 F.2d 997, 1009-ro (2d Cir. 1991) ("If property on which toxic substances pose
a significant hazard to public health cannot be abandoned, it must foIIow ... that
expenses to remove the threat posed by such substances are necessary to preserve
the estate."). The complex issues offederal environmental policy and the interaction between CERCLA and the Code require caution with generalization from these
cases.
116 · Dobbins, 35 F.3d at 867 (collecting authority), focuses on the mere possession
of creditor property versus affirmative use or conscious exploitation of resources.
Id. (citations omitted) (noting that "a benefit to the estate results only from use of
the ... property" and "[t]hat which is actually utilized by a Trustee in the operation
of a debtor's business is a necessary cost"). Dobbins and its ancestors/progeny have
enjoyed more citations vigor than the Supreme Court's odd tort case of Reading Co.
v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471 (1968), which established the proposition, largely on policy
grounds, that a postpetition tort damages claim should enjoy administrative priority. Id. at 485. Nearly aII subsequent cases have cabined Brown to torts. See, e.g., In re
Lazar, 207 B.R. 668, 681 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1997) ("From Reading arose the general rule
that the postpetition tort liabilities of a business that continues to operate in bankruptcy qualify for administrative expense priority as actual and necessary expenses
for preservation of the estate.").
' 17 · I have no problem with the debtor paying administrative priority expenses for
intra-bankruptcy usage under the contract.
118 · We might also draw indirect support from the Supreme Court's recent musings in Czyzewski v. ]evic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 985 (2017) that priority provisions can be treated more flexibly in the context of reorganization when value is
created for all creditors but less so in the context of final liquidation where claimed
priority must be scrutinized especiaIIy rigorously.
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ple conclusion is that because unwanted non-executory contracts never
confer any benefit, ever, upon the estate, their breach damages upon
rejection cannot find the textual anchor to avail themselves of section
503(b).129 They are neither an "actual" nor "necessary" cost of"preserving"
the estate. As such, the concern of presumed priority status collapses,
permitting the debtor to abandon property of a contractual albatross
under section 554.130 Ample case law supports this proposition. 131
2. Assumlng the Golden Goose

Previously, I have contended that a debtor need do nothing to
"assume" an advantageous non-executory contract; it automatically
vests its way into the estate through section 541. But for simplicity, that prior discussion assumed the contract was not in default.
If we relax that assumption, the debtor faces a harder task. Recall
both that (1) general state contract law permits a contract party facing material breach to walk away from the contract in self-help and
(2) bankruptcy law tries, absent a countervailing federal bankruptcy
policy interest, to respect state law entitlements (such as contract

129· The court in Mason v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re FBI Distribution Corp.), 330 F.3d 36, 48-49 (1st Cir. 2003) embraced this logic. It disagreed that the

breach claim on a non-executory contract should get administrative claim priority,
because even though the contract was breached postpetition, and even though as
a non-executory contract, it apparently was unrejectable and saddled the estate in
perpetuity, it nonetheless did not confer any benefit on the debtor postpetition. ld.
Accordingly, the breach claim was held to be a general unsecured claim (mimicking
the outcome of section 365(g)(1) as if the contract had been executory and rejected),
following my proposed analysis.
' 30· At least one court has adopted my approach of treating the "rejected" nonexecutory contract the same as if rejected under section 365. See In re Hawker
Beechcraft, Inc., 486 B.R. 264, 277 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) (awarding prepetition
breach claim for damages for non-executory contract rejected by debtor); see also
In re Majestic Capital, Ltd., 463 B.R. 289, 299 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (allowing the
debtor to reject COO's employment contract even though "the contract was not
executory" and denying administrative priority).
,p. See, e.g., Dobbins, 35 F.3d at 868 ("[l]t ... strikes us as inequitable to tax unsecured creditors for a decline in the value of collateral when the decline does not
result from a use that actually benefits the estate.").
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remedies) to the maximum extent possible. 132 Thus, we start from an
orientation that a contract in material default should be cancelable
by the counterparty and not subject to any resuscitation in bankruptcy absent some special Code power.
Section 365, however, accords just such special power. Section 365(b)'s condition on assumption that requires cure necessarily
implies a power to cure. The precise scope of the section 365 cure
power is not free from textual doubt and warrants its own painful
statutory exegesis, 133 but it would be absurd to suggest there is no
power to cure implicit in section 365(b). Case closed for executory
contracts. For non-executory contracts, which by definition cannot
avail themselves of section 365(b) and its cure power, the power to
cure must come from elsewhere.
a. Reorganization

Fortunately for reorganization cases, the Code expressly confers a
power to cure defaults in a plan of reorganization. 134 Thus, statutorily, there is no important difference between the power to cure
executory contracts and non-executory contracts in reorganization
132· Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55, 57 (1979) (holding that state law should
presumptively determine rights and obligations of debtors and creditors absent a
countervailing federal bankruptcy policy evidenced by structure, text, and history
of the Code).
'll• Compare ln re Claremont Acquisition Corp., lnc., n3 F.3d 1029, 1035 (9th Cir.
1997) (holding debtors may not assume or reject a contract that is impossible to
cure), with 1n re Vitanza, No. 98-196nDWS, 1998 WL 808629, at *20, *24 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 1998) (allowing assumption despite impossible-to-cure default). See
also ln re Bank.vest Capital Corp., 270 B.R. 541, 543 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001) ("[P]enalty
rate obligation and a nonmonetary default are two separate types of breaches which
a debtor is not required to cure prior to assumption of a contract."). Congress tried
to fix these provisions with BAPCPA, but it's unclear if it did. Risa Lynn Wolf-Smith,
Bankruptcy Reform and Nonmonetary Defaults-What Have They Done Now? Am.
Bankr. lnst. J., Aug. 2005, at 6, 35. ("[C]hanges made in the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1994 left practitioners unsure about whether debtors' obligations to cure nonmonetary defaults had been eliminated. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) has finally answered some of the questions,
though the language is murky.").
134· n U.S.C. J m3(a)(5)(G), 1322(c)(1) (2012).
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cases. 135 The harder problem, then, is in liquidation cases under
chapter 7, where the non-executory contract finds no succor analogous to section 365, u23, or 1322. And, indeed, there might be an
inverse textual implication that the absence of these explicit textual
cure provisions should be read to forbid it "interstitially" for chapter 7 debtors.
h. Liquidation

The question of the chapter 7 debtor seeking to assume a defaulted
non-executory golden goose is admittedly the thorniest for this analysis. I flag at the outset that this subset is a rare one. Most executoriness fights Westbrook and White unearthed in their comprehensive
empirical study were in reorganization cases, and of the subset of
liquidation cases, not one involved an assumption battle.'36 Nonetheless, abundant caution counsels that we press on to see if such
a power can be found. And to tackle this question, we can initially

135• There are discrepancies at the margin. For example, the general power to cure
in section 1123(a)(1)(G) does not excuse penalties of the sort expressly excused from
cure for executory contracts under section 365(b)(2)(D), but it is hard to imagine this
wrinkle ever becoming a driver of future executoriness litigation. (A strand of case
law unnecessary to resolve here struggles to reconcile section 365(b)(2) and rr23(d).
See, e.g., In re Sagamore Partners, Ltd., Banlcr. Appeals, 512 B.R. 296, 306-13 (S.D.
Fla. 2014) (attempting to harmonize section 365(b)(2) with section 1123(d)), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part and remanded sub nom. In re Sagamore Partners, Ltd., Fed. Appx.
864 (nth Cir. 2015); In re Prue. Bus. Park Ltd. P'ship, 257 B.R. 517, 520-21 (Bankr. D.
Ariz. 2001) (relying on section 365(b)(2} in addressing section II23(d) and the 1994
amendments).) Of course, not everyone wants to cure in reorganization. In one
unusual case, Meilburger v. Endeka Enterprises UC (In re Tsiaoushis), the reorganizing
debtor wanted to ipso facto dissolve an LLC agreement and so argued that the LLC
agreement was non-executory to avoid section 365(e)'s invalidation clause. 383 B.R.
616, 616-17 (Banlcr. E.D. Va. 2007) (noting chapter II trustee's opposition to the LLC
property manager's motion contending that the operating agreement was executory). This case's odd posture makes it of limited helpfulness, alas, but still fun.
136· See Westbrook & White, supra note 6, at 536-61 app. (analyzing thirty-three
cases in an appendix-only two of which involved liquidations, and none involved
a debtor attempting to assume an executory contract where the counterparty
objected on non-executoriness grounds).
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divide the liquidation universe of contractual defaults into "Ipso
Facto" Breaches and "Everything Else" Breaches.
i. Ipso Facto

Consider first ipso facto defaults, where the sole breach of the contract
is the very occurrence of bankruptcy. Does the Code permit the debtor
to cure?137 1 think the answer is probably "yes" given section 541(c)(1).138
That provision of the Code invalidates ipso facto clauses that would terminate a contract and thus prevent it from becoming property of the
estate. So the federal hostility to ipso facto clauses is clearly established. '39
The Code also invalidates ipso facto clauses and excuses them from
the cure requirements of section 365(b). 140 Should this be taken as a
textual signal that section 541 cannot be relied upon to do all the work
of rescue from ipso facto clauses? 1 don't think so. Even leaving aside
the permissibility of Congress using some belt and suspenders to avoid
negative implications (perhaps having some overlap between section
541(c)(2) and 365(b)(2)), if we really wanted to get down into the textual
weeds, we could point to section 365(b)(2)'s nominally broader scope
than section 541(c)(1)'s. For example, section 365(b)(2) expands the denigration of ipso facto terms to those triggered by postpetition finances. 14'

' 37· Perhaps "ignore" is better than "cure," because what would "cure" even mean
in this context-voluntarily dismissing the petition?
138 · See II U.S.C. J 541(c)(1) (2012) ("[A]n interest of the debtor in property becomes
property of the estate ... notwithstanding any provision in an agreement . . . or
applicable nonbankruptcy law- ... (B) that is conditioned on the insolvency or
financial condition of the debtor.").
' 39 · Note the historical contrast from earlier bankruptcy laws where ipso facto
clauses were honored; perhaps Congress over time bristled at the destruction of
value. Countryman has an excellent historical discussion on courts' reluctance to
give effect to ipso facto clauses, with fundamental disagreement over (a) whether the
Act's respect of them with regard to unexpired leases should be cabined to leases or
extended to all executory contracts, and (b) whether they could be respected only in
straight bankruptcy (versus chapter reorganization) cases under the Act. Countryman 11, supra note 23, at 521-27.
140· II U.S.C. § 365(b)(2) (2012) (excusing ipso facto default cure); section 365(e)(1)
(invalidating ipso facto default clauses).
w Id. section 365(b)(2).
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More importantly, if we step back from the text to consider the structure and purpose of the Code, it makes little sense to invalidate an ipso
facto clause in an executory contract for purposes of getting the contract
into the bankruptcy estate only to find that, but for section 365(b)(2), the
same contract would be unassumable. What would the purpose of its
entry into the estate have even been-to await inevitable rejection? But of
course, ifwe take seriously the concept ofa non-executory contract, then
we immediately recall section 365 is of no moment because such a contract vests into the estate automatically by virtue of section 541, and it is
quite clear that section 541(c)(1) invalidates the ipso facto clause at the vesting stage.142 Accordingly, even for the chapter 7 debtor, who is accorded
no textually explicit power to cure defaults, it seems uncontentious to
claim that defaults on account of ipso facto clauses may be ignored and
the federal bankruptcy policy of hostility toward them may comfortably
preempt the state law contract right of automatic termination.'43
ii. Everything Else

The harder question, then, is the Everything Else world of defaults.
Can they be cured for the chapter 7 debtor? After all, if a nonexecutory contract is a discrete "thing" that enters the estate irrespective of section 365, then that "thing" is a contract already in
default. Assuming no stay violation,144 presumably the counterparty
142· This is the approach taken by In re Denman, 513 B.R. 720, 725, 727 (Bankr.
W.D. Tenn. 2014) and Movitz v. Fiesta Inv., LLC (In re Ehmann), 319 B.R. 200, 206
(Bankr. D. Ariz. 2005).
143 · A strand ofLLC cases has tried to revivify state laws providing for ipso facto termination of contracts through the back door of section 365(c)(r), which bars assumption of contracts if assignment is prohibited by applicable non-bankruptcy law. n
U.S.C. J 365(c)(1). These cases sneakily say that while the contract is not ipso facto terminated (per section 365(e)), it can never be assumed (per section 365(c)(r)), leading to
the same result: killing the contract for the debtor. This proposition is contentious.
Compare, e.g., Nw. Wholesale, Inc. v. PAC Organic Fruit, LLC, 357 P. 3d 650, 662-63
(Wash. 2015) (holding section 365(e)(1)'s prohibition against ipso facto clauses to be
inapplicable), with, e.g., Horizons A Far, LLC v. Webber (In re Soderstrom), 484 B.R. 874,
880 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2013) (holding section 365 applies if the contract is executory).
14 4 · It is readily possible that a declaration of breach could be shown as an attempt
to punish the debtor for stiffing the counterparty. See, e.g., Pester Ref Co. v. Ins. Co.
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has the right to exercise the termination right for self-help. Can
the bankruptcy debtor, nonetheless, ram cure down the counterparty's throat? Here, I concede a need to resort to weaker textual
footing, but 1 take solace in the Code's Last Refuge of the Textually
Damned, section 105.,4,
Let's consider the situation in which it may arise. A debtor in liquidation is in default on a valuable contract the trustee wishes to
assume, say, an LLC operating agreement, but the counterparty has
successfully argued the contract is non-executory because remaining
performance is only due on one side. The trustee promptly offers to
cure, noting that the counterparty has incurred no financial harm on
account of the default. Nonetheless, the counterparty recalcitrantly
insists on its rights to terminate the contract, seizing upon the technical right of the default as an escape route from the unfavorable
bargain. Just to close the loop, state law has no equitable doctrines of
excuse that the hapless debtor can point out to stave off this churlish termination. 146 At wit's end, the trustee comes to the bankruptcy
court and says, "Look, this contract has value for the creditors, it's
no skin off the counterparty's nose because all defaults have been
cured, and so 1would like an injunction under section 105 preventing
him from exercising his self-help remedy of termination." Could the
bankruptcy court issue such relief?
This hypothetical presents sympathetic facts for just such a
countervailing federal policy-the preservation of value for creditors with no offsetting harm to the counterparty (other than being
made to live with the bad deal it made)-that warrants preempting

of N. Am. (In re Pester Ref. Co.), 58 B.R 189, 191 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1985) ("Even if the
insurance contract was not treated as an executory contract, the unilateral act of
INA to cancel the policy would be barred by the automatic stay of u U.S.C. J 362(a). ").
' 45 · II U.S.C. J 105(a) (2012) ("The court may issue any order, process, or judgment
that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.").
146· Cf., e.g., 1 Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 229 (Am. Law lnst. 1981)
(establishing that a non-occurrence of a condition can be excused if the non-occurrence would result in disproportionate forfeiture).
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the counterparty's state law self-termination rights.147 Well before
Timbers,1 48 the Supreme Court accorded great latitude to bankruptcy
courts to enjoin difficult creditors whose actions would imperil a
bankruptcy proceeding's success. 149 And, of course, since the contract is being ratified by the estate, any subsequent breach damages
would be entitled to administrative priority as a backstop, according the counterparty even more comfort. 150 As a final kicker, the
debtor would note that under chapter u, this surly creditor would
be deemed to have supported the plan as unimpaired. 151 Indeed, on
these facts, I would think the case for injunctive relief would be presumptively attractive; albeit requiring some hoops to jump through,
cure would be allowed, by hook or by section rn5 crook. If that is so,
then even the hardest case of a non-executory contract-the nonipso facto default of a chapter 7 debtor's contract-still can be cured
under a properly purposive reading of the Code. It's not as textually
straightforward as section 365(b), but the cure power is still there.
3. Summary

Note what a thorough working through of the Code's application to
a non-executory contract reveals: far from relying on section 365, the
debtor or trustee has ample opportunity under the Code, perhaps with
some creativity but surely on solid textual footing, to cure an attractive contract's default and thereby retain a golden goose. This means,

147• Westbrook offers some initial insights into what fundamental bankruptcy
policies might be (at least with respect to contracts), listing four basic policies. Westbrook & White, supra note 6, at 515-17. I accept these at face value and note that
maximization of creditor value appears front and center on this policy list.
i,.a. See United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S.
365, 372, 377-78 (1988) (upholding the restriction of secured creditors' compensation
for lost time value of their collateral).
149- The canonical case for this proposition is Cont1 Ill. Nat'/ Bank & Tr. Co. v. Chi.
R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 678-79 (1935), although there was some debate over
that holding's application to straight bankruptcy liquidation cases. Id. at 671-72. See
also Countryman 11, supra note 23, at 517 (discussing case law).
150· II U.S.C. j 365(g}(2) (2012}.
'51. Id. section u24(2).
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crucially, that the power to cure actually requires no recourse to section 365(b) and thus no concomitant need to demonstrate executoriness: executory and non-executory contracts alike can be cured. And
if that is correct, then I have succeeded in my underlying mission of
eliminating the main functional difference in the treatment of executory versus non-executory contracts under the Code. Indeed, I am too
modest. Not only have I collapsed the difference between executory
and non-executory contracts under the Code regarding the ability to
assume a golden goose, but I have also similarly collapsed the distinction regarding the rejection of an albatross, by dispatching the concern of priority repayment of section 554 abandonment damages. My
mission accomplished, the counterparty has lost the primary foundation for the arbitrage opportunity, which means the ex ante incentives
to litigate executoriness will dry up. Executoriness remains but it has
lost all its sting. 152 As such, I no longer care about the definition of
executoriness, and, more importantly, nor will anyone else. 153 This is
perhaps a radical approach to executory contracts, but its elimination
of senseless litigation should make it normatively attractive.
152· At worst, l have created a new boilerplate duty to tack on a footnote to every
section 365 motion that says, "in the event this contract is found to be non-executory, the debtor retains its rights under section 541 and moves to abandon under
section 554." (This is a trivial evil compared to Stem v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (20n),
this generation's fount of bankruptcy litigation.)
153· If pushed for my own definitional preference, I would revert to Williston's:
"[A] contract, the obligation of which relates to the future, or a contract under
which the parties have bound themselves to future activity that is not yet completed
or performed." r Samuel Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts section 1:19
(4th ed. 2007). See also 3A William Collier, Collier on Bankruptcy 63.33, at 1935 (14th
ed. 1940) ("All contracts to a greater or less extent are executory. When they cease to
be so, they cease to be contracts.") (citing Williston). This approach has a pedigree
in the legislative history to the Code, see In re Norquist, 43 B.R. 224, 225, 228 (Bankr.
E.D. Wash. 1984) (citing Williston and stating "the Supreme Court in citing the legislative history appears to have agreed with the expression of Congress that a precise definition of an executory contract is inadvisable"), and Westbrook, too, finds
it congenial. Westbrook & White, supra note 6, at 520 (explaining that "executory"
should be understood in light of common law). Thus, I do not care about "truly"
non-executory contracts in the sense of discussing sunsets after dark, Westbrook,
supra note 3, at 243, just those contracts that flunk the Countryman test but still
have unperformed aspects.
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N. Counterarguments
I anticipate several respectable counterarguments to this new
approach, and so I offer this preemptive rebuttal.

A. Reading "Executory" Out of the Code?
This is a trick objection, because many, like Westbrook, want to read
it out of the Code, so would see this as praise rather than criticism
to my approach of taking the idea of a non-executory contract seriously. But I can see a deeply committed textualist bemoaning that
I have rendered "executory" redundant, effectively redrafting section
365 as if the word had been deleted.154
This critique misses the mark. My treatment of non-executory
contracts merely mimics the treatment of executory contracts under
section 365, but does so through a distinct doctrinal route that
respects the formal categorical difference. Now, whether this synthetic replication upsets the "structure" of the Code's "implicit policies" by creating near-redundancy is a separate attack, but as soon
as we move into the structure and policies of the Code, I gain the
theoretical high ground by pointing to the absolute absence of justification found anywhere in the Code (or anywhere else) to treat nonexecutory contracts differently from executory contracts. 155

B. Evading Section 365' s Burdens?
My response to the prior criticism unfortunately runs right into
the snare of this correlative complaint: if non-executory contracts
154- Similar angst enraged the district court in Stewart, which objected to the
treatment of a non-executory contract's breach as a claim under section 502, because
to do so would treat the contract as rejected under section 365(b), which was not
allowed in its view-a holding that was promptly reversed on appeal. See Stewart
Foods, Inc. v. Broecker (In re Stewart Foods, Inc.), 64 F.3d 141, 144-45 (4th Cir. 1995).
155- See In re ZRM-Oklahoma P'ship, 156 B.R. 67, 70-71 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1993)
(emphasizing the importance of interpreting the Code in a "coherent and consistent" manner).
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merely mimic section 365 treatment, but don't exactly run through
the section 365 gauntlet, then that means the burdensome provisions of section 365 (e.g., the adequate assurances of future performance as a precondition to assumption under section 365(b)(r)(C)),
are simply excused for non-executory contracts. If so, I've turned
executoriness on its head by creating a reverse arbitrage where the
debtors will now try to argue their contracts aren't executory to
evade such requirements!'56
This concern, while logically articulable, is overstated for two interrelated reasons. First, to a considerable extent, the requirements of

' 56 · This appears to have happened in the cryptic Bronner v. Chenoweth-Massie
P'ship (In re Nat'l Fin. Realty Tr.), 226 B.R. 586, 587-88 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1998), in

which the receiver wrote a sloppy plan forgetting to assume a valuable option in
chapter u. Id. When the counterparty caught him and demanded evidence of
assumption, he pivoted to say the contract was non-executory and so had not been
presumptively rejected (as all executory contracts had been) under the plan. Id.
The court agreed and the option, deemed non-executory, survived the plan, saving the receiver's bacon. Id. The counterparty's unsuccessful argument had sounded
in notice, implying that absent such evidence of assumption the counterparty was
right to infer deemed rejection and enjoy repose accordingly. Id. The counterparty's
problem, however, is really in the Code's lack of default rules for executory contracts
in non-chapter 7 cases. Westbrook and White imply that the option should have
been deemed rejected under section 365(d), but 1 don't see how that's the case, unless
this was a chapter 7 case, which it did not appear to be. See Westbrook & White,
supra note 6, at 524. Section 365(d)(2) merely sets a deadline for the assumption/
rejection decision, but, unlike section 365(d)(1), it does not specify the consequences
of the failure to act. This results in a case law quagmire. See, e.g., Proc. Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Greystone lll Joint Venture (In re Greystone lll Joint Venture), 995 F.2d 1274, 1281
(5th Cir. 1991) (noting that a lease neither assumed nor rejected before a chapter n
plan confirmation just rides through with the debtor still bound and with the creditor without a provable claim). Note section 365(p), which does provide a default
rule in the case of inaction, interestingly does not textually restrict its application
to unexpired leases. u U.S.C. § 365(p) (2012). Indeed, this is not the only provision
of section 365 that does not apply on its face to executory contracts: section 365(0)
would appear to apply only to non-executory contracts-and this is a subsection of
section 365! See id. section 365(0):
[T]he trustee shall be deemed to have assumed ... and shall immediately cure
any deficit under, any commitment by the debtor to a Federal depository institutions regulatory agency ... to maintain the capital of an insured depository institution, and any claim for a subsequent breach of the obligations thereunder shall be
entitled to priority under section 507.
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section 365(b)(1)(C) (and (b)(1)(B) for that matter) are largely redundant to
contract rights under state law.157 Consider by way of example the
ubiquitous Uniform Commercial Code's sales provisions in Article 2.
There, the insolvency of the buyer is listed as a categorical example of
objective grounds for insecurity, and insecurity gives rise to the right
to demand adequate assurance of future performance.1s8 Second,
recall that the foundation of the statutory power to allow nonconsensual cure (outside the reorganization context) is likely injunctive
relief through section 105, and so, in fashioning that relief, a bankruptcy court would be loath to give the debtor a "freebie" of not having to provide assurances that her executory-contract-holding peer
would, especially when such assurances are likely the required baseline at state law. (There certainly are no countervailing federal policies requiring Butner divergence from state law that spring to mind.)
In short, I am not denying the risk,'59 but I think it likely the concern
' 57 · See II U.S.C. J 365(b)(1)(B) (2012) (requiring compensation for breach damages
before assumption); id. section 365(b)(1)(C) (requiring adequate assurance of future
performance before assumption).
158· U.C.C. J 2-609 cmt. 3 (Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm'n 2002) ("[A] buyer
who falls behind in 'his account' with the seller ... impairs the seller's expectation
of due performance.").
159· One case where this has popped up is BNY, Capital Funding LLC v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 345 B.R. 549 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2006). There, the debtor was able to retain a
contract to make a financial accommodation, despite the bar of section 365(c)(2), by
successfully persuading the court that the contract was non-executory and hence
fell outside section 365 and section 365(c)(2). Id. at 553, 555. Westbrook and White
see this as an outrage, where U.S. Airways got out of section 365(c)(2) jail free, Westbrook & White, supra note 6, at 525, but I'm more ambivalent. Even leaving aside the
court's point that the debtor had onerous financial conditions precedent to meet
before exercise (not least of which was keeping current on the aircraft leases to the
optioner), 345 B.R. at 555, I am not sure how much divergence from state law evasion
of section 365(c)(2) would entail. If, as the U.S. Airways court conceded, the option
was a contract (albeit a non-executory one), then the traditional contract defenses
and excuses spring into action. Certainly it is an open question whether insolvency
of the counterparty would discharge performance, either on grounds of material
mistake, 1 Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 152 (Am. Law Inst. 1981), or
frustration of purpose, id. section 265-68, especially if the subject matter of the contract was to make a loan. At a minimum, adequate assurances would be demandable
as a condition to continuation. For a good background discussion of Congress' intent
behind section 365(c)(2), see In re Teligent, 268 B.R. 723, 737 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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of seeking a declaration of non-executoriness as a bypass around section 365's conditions on assumptions will arise infrequently.
Finally, I should mention the cognate idea of "evading" judicial review under section 365(a). 160 Recall that the assumption-or
rejection-of an executory contract requires court approval. 161 If
non-executory contracts do not run through section 365, are nondebtor stakeholders stripped of their judicial oversight protection?
Again, I think this concern is overstated, even leaving aside the
implicitly heroic assumptions about the judicial role in a corporate
decision largely governed by the business judgment rule. First, a
non-executory contract that is rejected is abandoned under section 554, and that does require a court hearing even if it does not
explicitly require "approval."162 Few debtors will abandon a valuable
contract for nefarious reasons, fess up to it in open court, and then
sit back and stare a judge in the eyes and coolly sneer, "Nothing
you can do about it because it isn't even your decision to approve!"
No litigant has that much political capital to squander, and every
judge has heard of section 105 and can trot out decisions intoning
that bankruptcy courts are courts of equity. 163 Second, a non-executory contract in default that is assumed will require court blessing as well, either through the discretionary power to confirm the
plan of reorganization or the discretionary power to order the cure
injunctively in liquidation. So all roads lead to court involvement;
no wool will be pulled over judicial eyes.

160· Section 365(a)'s requirement of court approval stems from a long history of
courts inserting themselves into an oversight role under the Act. See Countryman
11, supra note 23, at 556.
161• See Allegheny Ctr. Assocs. v. Appliance Store, Inc. (In re Appliance Store, Inc.), 148
B.R. 226, 232 (Banlcr. W.D. Pa. 1992) (holding that section 365(a) superseded prior case
law allowing assumption without court approval).
161· The section 554 hearing will also give notice to the counterparty definitively
clarifying its contractual rights.
•6J. Adam J. Levitin, Toward a Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy: Judicial
Lawmaking in a Statutory Regime, 80 Am. Bankr. L.J. r, r (2006) ("A basic tenet of
bankruptcy practice is that 'the bankruptcy court is a court of equity."') (citations
omitted).
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C. Forfeiting Section 365's Benefits?
Conversely, there is the reverse concern: that, other than the power
to cure, there are other benefits to the debtor in section 365 that the
non-executory-contract-holding debtor will not be able to access.
Does my synthetic replication of section 365 through other provisions of the Code cover these benefits as well? Here, I think I have
met my Waterloo and have to concede not. But it is a trivial Waterloo. The principal benefit in section 365, beyond the general power
to cure addressed previously, is the excuse of an impossible-to-cure
default for some forms of unexpired leases. 164
Section 365(b)(1)(A)'s text is a mess, but it appears to excuse
impossible-to-cure defaults of real-property leases (and add on some
extra requirements for what to do ifthat lease is non-residential). 16s The
implication of the most likely reading of the drafting is that a debtor
with an impossible-to-cure default on a personal property lease is
just out of luck: the impossibility precludes cure, and non-cure precludes assumption. Here, I am forced to concede an apparent benefit
unique to section 365; the debtor outside section 365 has no similar
salvation. That said, the problem appears trivial when we, for the first
time, confront section 365's application both to unexpired leases and
to executory contracts. While "executoriness" has generated a litigation minefield, "unexpired" has not. Parties (and courts) are less
likely to disagree whether a lease is over or not; one anticipates an
•64• There is the boondoggle damage claim under section 507(a)(2) and 502(b)(7)
for certain nonresidential real property leases, 11 U.S.C. section 507(a)(2), 502(b)(7)
(2012), but leases interest me less than contracts for the reasons given in the text.
If pressed, 1 could parse the debtor's power to sidestep "cure□" with "provid[ing]
adequate assurance" of "prompt□" cure as a possible benefit accorded by the Code
unavailable at state contract law, but that's too fine a pinhead upon which to dance.
Id. section 365(b)(1)(A).
165· A plausible reading is that section 365(b) does the opposite and declares that
impossible-to-cure defaults on real property leases are just lethal, period, for the
debtor seeking assumption, but that nonresidential leases are saved from the fire if
the specified conditions are met. This interpretation requires ascribing to Congress
an intent to render residential leases harder for debtors to assume than nonresidential ones, a reading of section 365(b) that skirts absurdity.
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empty set of litigants fighting over whether and how the debtor can
cure the defaults of an expired lease. 166

D. Inapplicability of Other Section 365 Provisions'?
There are surely other differences that would arise from whether or
not a contract falls under section 365, but it is difficult to say ex ante
which way they cut, let alone predict whether they will birth a new
fount of arbitrage. For example, the sixty-day deemed rejection rule
is clearly one that would only apply to executory contracts under
section 365,16? but it's hard to say with any confidence whether this
will cause many executoriness fights. It surely does sometimes,168
but it seems likely that whatever incentive effect it has is dwarfed by
the status quo's preoccupation with the make-or-break excutoriness
question of power to assume/reject vel non. 169
The two most significant wild cards are the special rules within
section 365 for real estate contracts and intellectual property agreements.170 The real estate rules are easier: the special property-like remedy accorded by section 365(i)(2) likely maps many states' real-property
rules for vendees in possession.'71 (Somewhat ironically, a vendee who
has moved into full possession is likely to have tendered full payment

166 · Although, they do fight the timing of when the defibrillators have to come off.
See II U.S.C. § 541(b)(2) (2012) (excluding from estate nonresidential real property
leases that expire under their own timing provisions).
167 Id. section 365(d)(1).
168 · lt came up in Ebert v. DeVries Family Farm, LLC (In re Devries), No. n-43165DML-7, 2014 WL 4294540, at* 4 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2014) (trustee who missed
sixty-day deadline to assume tried to argue that the LLC operating agreement was
non-executory so it would not be deemed rejected).
169 · See, e.g., Foothills Tex., Inc. v. MTGLQ lnv'rs, L.P. (In re Foothills Tex., Inc.), 476
B.R. 143, 155 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012) (conceiving the debtor's entire adversary proceeding to tum on whether the contract was executory).
170 · II U.S.C. § 365(i)(2) (2012) (special counterparty remedies for vendees in possession); id. section 365(j) (vendees out of possession); id. section 365(n)(1) (intellectual property licensees).
'7'· See, e.g., Nickels Midway Pier, LLC v. Wild Waves, LLC (In re Nickel.s Midway
Pier, LLC), 341 B.R. 486, 496-97 (D. N.J. 2006) (relying on state law to determine that
section 365(i) was inapplicable).
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and may not be in an executory contract at all.) And because it is such
a rarely litigated provision of the Code, it is unclear whether section
365(j)'s rules for vendees not-yet-in-possession intend to strip property rights if state law grants an equitable property remedy under
a conversion doctrine. Accordingly, it is difficult to assess whether
there is a material (or any) inside-versus-outside section 365 difference here, let alone whether executoriness fights will be prevalent as
a consequence.112
The hardest prediction pertains to the intellectual property rules
of section 365(n). lt is difficult to score section 365(n)'s ancillary provisions. ' 73 Even Westbrook throws up his hands and concedes they largely
(if not identically) track preexisting non-bankruptcy contract rights.174
Review of the case law involving section 365(n) where executoriness is
disputed shows an unsurprising focus on the rejection vel non question (i.e., can the license be rejected or not).m There do not appear to
be many secondary disputes over attempts to avoid perceived burdens
of these ancillary provisions.176 Moreover, there are a host of other
intellectual property disputes (e.g., trademarks) that do not even fall

172 · The closest case 1 could find to mentioning this issue was In re Nickels Midway Pier, LLC, which mused in dicta on the preemptive scope of section 365 and its
interaction with state law specific performance remedies (and more specifically, the
separate provision of the Code defining "claim"). Id. at 498-99.
173· n U.S.C. § 365(n)(1)(B) (2012) (allowing some licensees to retain rights to
licensed IP or supplementary agreements in return for continued royalty payments).
174 · Westbrook & White, supra note 6, at 532, 533 n.246. Westbrook indeed brands
any divergence from state law in section 365(n) (and cognate subsections) "congressional mistakes." Westbrook, supra note 3, at 331 n.434.
175 · See, e.g., Lewis Bros. Bakeries Inc. v. Interstate Brands Corp. (In re Interstate Bakeries Corp.), 751 F.3d 955, 961-64 (8th Cir. 2014) (applying the Countryman test to
uphold the objection that the license could not be rejected as it was non-executory).
This case presents the wonderful surreality of the debtor's attempt first to reject
the contract, and then subsequent withdrawal of that motion and substitution of a
motion to assume it. Id. at 959. Nonetheless, the counterparty's resistance persisted
in both postures! Id. at 964.
176 One example is Szilagyi v. Chi. Am Mfg., UC (In re Lakewood Eng'g & Mfg. Co.),
459 B.R. 306 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 20n), in which the parties fought over the scope of the
waiver provisions of section 365(n)(2)(C). Id. at 341. But there was no challenge to
executoriness in that case, which was conceded. Id. at 342.

580 JOHN A E. POTTOW

under this subsection's scope.177 In sum, loath as I am to end on an
equivocal note, in all honesty I cannot say whether these residual issues
will drive ongoing executoriness disputes; I can just share empirical
skepticism that they are likely to be meaningful.178

V. A (Very Quick) Road Test Case Study
In closing, let us take a brief road test to see how the new approach
would have better served a famous bankruptcy case, Exide. 179 ln Exide,
the bankruptcy court {affirmed by the district court) held the debtor's burdensome trademark assignment contract to be executory and
allowed its rejection as a key step of the reorganization plan. 180 The
counterparty appealed all the way up to the Third Circuit, which
reversed and said the debtor's contract was not executory under
the Countryman test and hence could not be rejected.'8' The poor
bankruptcy court was left with a reorganized debtor that was now
saddled with a trademark license that it thought had been cancelled
but was now apparently binding.182 Under the functional approach,
of course, it could have been rejected. Executoriness's definition
was not just fatal, but unclear in its application to the various courts
that faced the issue. Under my approach, the debtor would not have
cared. What the debtor could have done as soon as it realized it

U.S.C. § 101(3,;A) (2012).
Cf. Westbrook & White, supra note 6, at 5n (noting that the focus of executoriness fights is whether debtors can assume/reject the contract).
179· In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d 957 (3d Cir. 2010).
180 • Id. at 961.
181• Id. at 964 ("Because the Agreement is not an executory contract, Exide cannot
reject it.").
18 •· The debtor's backup argument that the contract had nonetheless been dealt
with under the plan as a claim was rejected by an angry remand court that invoked
judicial estoppel, finding the debtor's conduct end-runny. Exide Techs. v. Enersys Del.,
Inc. (In re Exide Techs.), Bankr. No. 02-m25 (KJC), Adv. No. ro-52766 (KJC), 2013 WL
85193, at *1, *7-8 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 8, 2013) (noting that the complaint was filed "in
an attempt to circumvent" the Third Circuit ruling).
177· II
178•
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was in dodgy executoriness terrain, which it did, 183 was simply tack
a footnote onto its section 365 rejection motion saying that in the
alternative, the motion was to abandon burdensome property of the
estate under section 554 to which it would not accord any damages
priority status. As such, either by section 365(g)(1) or by section 502,
the debtor would have paid off a monetary claim to the licensee and
moved on, as it hoped, with its reorganized life. All this would have
been independent of whether the Third Circuit adhered to Countryman, decided to overrule it in favor of Westbrook, or took some new
path (of which there is no shortage of options). 184

VI. Conclusion
The ABI Commission has made clear that executoriness is here to
stay. Since it is, we should stifle its arbitrage-inducing tendencies
by demonstrating how section 365's key functional outcomes can be
replicated by carefully applying other provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code to non-executory contracts, the residual category of agreements that flunk whatever test of executoriness is governing circuit
law. This new approach will redirect the executoriness litigation
energy to more productive fields. This path does not follow Westbrook directly. It does better: it honors him for having shown us the
right way.

183.

Id. at *4.

See, e.g., ln re Riodizio, Inc., 204 B.R. 417, 424 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (following
neither Countryman nor Westbrook).
184 ·

